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THE MEDICAL TREATMENT HEARSAY EXCEPTION IN
MARYLAND: A LOW POINT IN CLARITY FOR
PRACTITIONERS AND PROTECTION FOR UTIGANTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

A woman enters the office of her family praclllloner, worried
about a recurring headache. She fears that her ailment indicates
the inception of diabetes, high blood pressure, or any number of
potentially life-threatening illnesses. While she suspects the possibility of a more serious malady-the treatment of which may require
medical skill and knowledge exceeding that of a general practitioner-the woman visits her family doctor! for, if nothing else, guidance on the next step to take.
The family practitioner listens to the patient's difficulties, questions the patient about their onset,2 and then performs basic tests
in compliance with accepted medical practice. The results of these
tests indicate that whatever ails the patient is clearly beyond the
family practitioner's expertise and medical training. Therefore, the
family practitioner refers the patient to a specialist3 to receive neces1.

2.

3.

See Walter Rosser, Doctors Have Their Own Plan Jor Health Care: Family Physicians
Present Proposals Jor ReJorm in Ontario, LoNDON FREE PRESS, Aug. 29, 1999, at A9,
available in 1999 WL 25332425; Jerry Adler & Adam Rogers, The New War
Against Migraines, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 11, 1999, available in 1999 WL 9499226 (explaining that migraine sufferers go to headache specialists only after first seeing their family doctor).
Arguably, these statements would be fully admissible under the hearsay exception for then existing mental, emotional, or physical conditions. See, e.g.,
MD. R EVID. 5-803(b)(3); FED. R EVID. 803(3). If the patient was not experiencing the headache at the exact moment of expression, however, this hearsay exception is inapplicable. See, e.g., MD. R EVID. 5-803 (b) (3) (excluding "a
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will").
Because the family practitioner did not "treat" the patient, that doctor may be
nothing more than an examining physician under Maryland's medical treatment exception to the rule against hearsay. For a discussion of the reliability
of statements made to an "examining" physician, see infra notes 109-22 and
accompanying text. Although these statements can be used to lay the foundation for an expert's opinion or to rehabilitate an impeached witness, a party
cannot use the family practitioner's testimony as substantive evidence to prove
the inception, existence, or character of the headaches under current Mary-

237

238

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 29

sary treatment. 4
Unfortunately, the patient's recovery may not end there. If the
patient's ailment resulted from another person's action or negligence, the patient may pursue legal action against the tortfeasor to
remedy the harm suffered. However, a litigant in the patient's position may have difficulty presenting the testimony of the family practitioner because the testimony concerning the patient's pain is
based on hearsay.5 Yet, the family doctor's testimony can be trustworthy and significant in any subsequent litigation. 6
Although generally disfavored,? American courts admit hearsay
as substantive evidence if such statements fulfill one of the numerous hearsay exceptions. s Hearsay statements meeting the criteria of

4.

5.
6.

7.

8.

land law. For a discussion of the implications of the treating/examining distinction, see infra Part III.B.
See, e.g., Ralph Hyatt, Can Managed Care Acromrrwdate Mental Health?, USA ToDAY MAGAZINE, July 1, 1996, at 43, available in 1996 WL 9716402 (noting that
general practitioners often calion the expertise of specialists to diagnose and
treat complex symptoms); Arnold Birenbaum, Managed Care: WiU It Be For Everyone?, USA TODAY MAGAZINE, July 1, 1996, at 46, available in 1996 WL 9716403
(explaining that in health maintenance organizations, primary care physicians
make referrals to specialists when medically necessary).
For a definition of hearsay, see infra note 37 and accompanying text.
While it may be possible for the patient herself to testify as to the onset of the
pain, the family practitioner's testimony may be useful in subsequent litigation
if the plaintiff is impeached, relies on the family practitioner's opinion to determine the nature of her ailment, or if her testimony requires corroboration.
Such testimony may also playa critical role in establishing the plaintiff's compliance with the statute of limitations. Under the discovery rule, the statute of
limitations for a cause of action in tort begins when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the inception of the injury. See, e.g., Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d 677, 680 (1981) (establishing
the discovery rule for all tort causes of action); Edwards v. Demedis, 118 Md.
App. 541, 553, 703 A.2d 240, 24546 (1997), cert. denied, 349 Md. 234, 707 A.2d
240 (1998) (affirming the discovery rule in Maryland). Therefore, Maryland
courts would likely find the preliminary exchange between the family practitioner and the patient relevant when making this determination.
See infra notes 3446 and accompanying text. For a discussion on the desirability of hearsay statements made to physicians, in comparison to live court testimony, see infra note 91.
In the federal courts, there are eight forms of non-hearsay, 23 exceptions to
the rule against hearsay, five hearsay exceptions contingent on the availability
of the declarant, and a residual hearsay exception. See FED. R EVID. 801 (providing for statements that are non-hearsay); 803 (enumerating the hearsay exceptions); 804 (listing instances when hearsay is admissible if the declarant is
unavailable); 807 (containing the residual hearsay exception). Despite the
rule against hearsay, the residual hearsay exception allows a court to admit
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these exceptions do not endanger a court's interests in ensuring the
trustworthiness of these statements. 9 In many jurisdictions,lO including Maryland,11 courts admit statements made pursuant to medical
treatment under a general hearsay exception. However, Maryland
courts construe this medical treatment hearsay exception narrowly.u
This limited construction prevents litigants and prosecutors from using out-of-court statements made to "examining physicians" as substantive evidence. 13 Therefore, if the court considers the family practitioner described in the opening hypothetical as an examining
physician, this testimony will not be admitted as substantive evidence, and will not support a finding of liability for the patient
against an alleged tortfeasor. 14

9.
10.
11.
12.

13.

14.

out-of-court statements to prove a material fact if the statement is more probative of that fact than other admissible evidence, and the interests of the federal rules and justice would best be served by admitting the evidence. See FED.
R EVID. 807. Likewise, Maryland courts have similar provisions for hearsay exceptions, non-hearsay, and a residual hearsay exception. See MD. R EVID. 5802.1 (establishing the admissibility of prior statements by witnesses); 5-803
(permitting the admission of hearsay statements made by a party opponent
and 24 other exceptions that apply regardless of the availability of the declarant as a witness, including a residual hearsay exception); 5-804(b) (allowing
the admission of five forms of hearsay statements contingent on the inability
of the party to produce the declarant). Some commentators contend, however, that the number of hearsay exceptions effectively defeats the exclusionary rule's utility. See, e.g., Paul S. Milich, Hearsay Antinomies: The Case for Abolishing the Rure and Starting Over, 71 OR. L. REv. 723, 764 (1992) (" [A]lthough the
definition of hearsay and the core exclusionary rule have survived virtually intact, the steady growth of exceptions and exemptions have hollowed out the
rule, leaving a cavity largely occupied by admissible hearsay.").
See infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IlLB and accompanying text.
See generally Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 39-50, 536 A.2d 666, 684-90 (1988)
(comparing the Maryland and federal approaches to the medical treatment
hearsay exception).
There are numerous alternatives available through which a skillful litigant may
nonetheless present the hearsay evidence to the jury. For a discussion of these
methods and their effect on the utility of the treating/examining physician
distinction, see infra Part N.A and accompanying text.
A jury's verdict must be supported by substantive evidence to withstand an appellate challenge. See generally Johnson & Towers Baltimore, Inc. v. Bahbington, 264 Md. 724, 728, 288 A.2d 131, 134 (1972) (noting that a jury verdict based on competent evidence "should not be disturbed"); Durant v.
Perkins State Hosp., 251 Md. 467, 473, 248 A.2d 148, 151 (1968) (concluding
that where there is legally sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict, the appellate court will not question its finding); Gray v. Director of Patuxent Inst.,
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While Maryland courts have historically identified physicians
consulted primarily in preparation for litigation as examining physicians,15 the Court' of Special Appeals of Maryland recently expanded
the definition of examining physician. 16 The court defined a "nontreating" child abuse specialist as an examining physician, thereby
excluding the victim's statements to the doctor from evidenceP In
doing so, the court further (and unnecessarily) complicated and
contradicted existing Maryland case law. 1s
Due to the various guarantees of trustworthiness accompanying
statements, to physicians,19 the inconsistency with which Maryland
courts admit physicians' testimony as substantive evidence,20 and the
realities of the courtroom,21 Maryland should abandon the examining and treating physician distinction. 22 Rather than distinguishing
between two arbitrarily drawn categories, Maryland courts should
admit patients' out-of-court statements to physicians as substantive
evidence, and allow the fact-finder to determine the declarant's
credibility.23 In fact, admission of these statements would better fulfill the public policy initiatives underlying the medical treatment ~x
ception to the rule against hearsay.
To that end, Part II of this Comment examines the legal and

15.

16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

245 Md. 80, 84, 224 A.2d 879, 881 (1966) (refusing to oveI;turn a jury verdict
where there was "legally sufficient evidence to support the verdict of the
jury"). Evidence that a trial court admits for impeachment purposes only will
not satisfy the elements of a prima facie case. See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 104
Md. App. 273, 279 (1995) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 277 Md. 120, 126, 353 A.2d 263,
267 (1976) (concluding that statements made to a psychiatrist for the purpose
of qualifying him as a witness were in preparation of litigation and the lower
court properly struck the physician's conclusions because they were based
solely on the information told to him by the plaintiff); Parker v. State, 189
Md. 244, 24849, 55 A.2d 784, 786 (1947) (affirming the trial court's exclusion
of a doctor's testimony regarding a criminal defendant's medical "case history" relayed to the doctor by the defendant because the defendant was not
seeking treatment but "creating evidence on his own behalf").
For a discussion of the traditional definition of examining physician and how
recent Maryland case law broadened this definition, see infra notes 103-203
and accompanying text.
See infra notes 175-203 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 175-203 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 76-85, 103-07 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part IV.B.
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policy principles underlying the rule against hearsay,24 the rationale
underlying the medical treatment exception,25 and the common-law
concerns associated with this exception. 26 Part III traces, compares,
and contrasts the medical treatment hearsay exception in the
United States Supreme Court,27 as well as federaFB and Maryland
courts. 29 Part IV discusses existing practices that address the dangers
that the examining/treating physician distinction seeks to alleviate. 30
Finally, Part V concludes that Maryland's distinction between examining and treating physicians is unnecessary given the protections
afforded by the legal system and Maryland's Rules of Evidence. 31
II.

THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES32

24.
25.
26.

See infra Part ILA.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. Specifically, this Comment focuses on Maryland's hearsay exception for statements made in contemplation
of medical treatment. In this area, the evolution of special provisions for the
admission of statements by child abuse victims has been a significant vehicle
for change within the last two decades. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
§ 278, at 432 Uohn W. Strong, ed., 5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter "MCCORMICK"];
Lynn McLain, Children Are Losing Maryland's 'Tender Years" War, 27 U. BALT. L.
REv. 21 (1997) (discussing the statutorily provided tender years exception to
Maryland's rule against hearsay); Lynne E. Radke, Note, Michigan's New Hearsay Exception: The "Reinstatement" of the Common Law Tender Years Rule, 70 U.
DET. MERCY L. REv. 377 (1993) (discussing the statutorily provided tender
years exception to Michigan's rule against hearsay); Krista Mac Nevin Jee,
Note, Hearsay Exceptions in Child Almse Cases: Have the Courts and Legislatures Really Considered the ChiUP. 19 WHITTIER L. REv. 559 (1998) (discussing judicial
and legislative approaches to hearsay in child abuse cases). This Comment
will not concentrate exclusively on hearsay problems in the area of child
abuse cases; instead, it will discuss the general provisions and concerns underlying the medical treatment hearsay exception and the confusion created by
recent Maryland case law. Therefore, while it is necessary to discuss specifically the recent case law that concerns child abuse prosecutions, the discussion and analysis will address all attempts to proffer hearsay statements to examining physicians, such as in personal injury litigation.
See infra notes 74-102 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 20447 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 103-203 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 248-89 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 290-300 and accompanying text.
For an exhaustive examination of the evolution of hearsay, see 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1364 (Chadburn rev. 1974), 9 SIR WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF THE ENGUSH LAw 214-19 (Methuen & Co. Ltd. &
Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 3d ed. 1944).

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
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The General Considerations Governing the Rule Against Hearsay

To encourage the use of in-court testimony subject to the penalty of peIjury,33 protect a party's ability to examine statements offered as substantive evidence,34 and preserve a party's ability to
cross-examine witnesses,35 American courts exclude hearsay,36 which
has been defined as: "out-of-court assertion[s] offered in court for
the truth of the matter asserted, and thus resting for [their] value
on the credibility of the out-of-court declarant. "37 Hearsay statements38 also raise concerns about the court's ability to assure the declarant's39 memory,40 perception,41 narration,42 and sincerio/3 of the
33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

For a general discussion of the importance of the oath and personal presence
of the witness in court to assure the truthfulness of in-court testimony, see
MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 245, at 374; Wm. Garth Snider, The Linguistic
Hearsay Rule: A Jurisprudential Too~ 32 GoNZ. L. REv. 331, 338-39 (1996-97). But
see 5 WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 1362, at 10 (questioning the importance of
the oath).
See MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 245, at 374-75. Used in conjunction with the
rules of authentication, courts use the rule against hearsay to prevent a party
from admitting false or altered evidence for the truth of the matter asserted.
See, e.g., MD. R EVID. 5-901 to -903 (providing Maryland's requirements for authentication). But see Milich, supra note 8, at 723, 773-74 (arguing that the
hearsay exceptions provide litigants opportunities to admit falsified evidence
by tailoring evidence to fall within an exception).
See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 (1974) ("The primary justification for the exclusion of hearsay is the lack of any opportunity for the adversary to cros!H!xamine the absent declarant whose out-of-court statement is
introduced into evidence.") (footnote omitted); MCCORMICK, supra note 26, §
245, at 374-75; 5 WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 1367, at 32 (describing crossexamination as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
the truth"); Snider, supra note 33, at 337-39. But see GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 7.28, at 348 (3d ed. 1996) (noting the
lack of empirical data indicating the exposition of the hearsay dangers
through cros!H!xamination).
See generally Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 7, 536 A.2d 666, 669 (noting that
although there are numerous exceptions to the rule against hearsay, it is a
"rule of exclusion").
Id. 6, 536 A.2d at 668 (setting forth "a good working definition of hearsay");
accord In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 33, 549 A.2d 27, 33 (1988) (using the
same terminology as Cassidy and naming it the "classic definition" of hearsay).
See FED. R EVID. 801 (a) (defining a "statement" as "(1) an oral assertion or
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the
person as an assertion"); accord MD. R EVID. 5-801(a).
Throughout this Comment, "declarant" will describe an individual who initially makes a statement and "witness" will refer to an individual attesting to
the statement in court. See FED. R EVID. 801(b); MD. R EVID. 5-801 (b). For a
discussion of the parties generally involved in the typical scenario involving
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statement made.

40.

41.

42.

43.

hearsay concerns, see Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application
of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REv. 177, 177-79 (1948).
See Morgan, supra note 39, at 188. Here, courts determine whether the witness
or declarant retained an accurate impression of the perception underlying
the statement. See MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 245, at 373-74 (discussing the
factors upon which credibility of testimony depends); Snider, supra note 33, at
335-36 (pointing out that asking a witness to recall events in great detail is
often "rife with the possibility of inaccuracy"). A party's ability to crossexamine is critical to the fact-fInder's determination of the strength of the declarant's memory. See Morgan, supra note 39, at 188 (labeling the "most important service" of cross-examination as exposing the witness' inability to remember details of the subject of the testimony); Snider, supra note 33, at 336
(noting that subjecting a witness to cross-examination allows the trier of fact
to determine if the witness' recollection faded or was subconsciously altered).
Here, the key questions are whether the witness perceived what the witness
described, and whether that witness's perception was accurate. See MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 245, at 373; Snider, supra note 33, at 335 ("[TJhe hearsay rule recognizes the inherent faults in man's perception and attempts to
eliminate the least trustworthy testimonial evidence.") A party's ability to
cross-examine is essential here as well as carelessness, inadequacy, and other
detriments to an accurate perception may be exposed. See Morgan, supra note
39, at 188 (arguing that cross-examination exposes faults in perception and
memory, more so than any other hearsay dangers).
Courts determine whether the declarant's statement accurately reflects what
the declarant perceived or sensed. See MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 245, at
373-74 (noting that it must be determined whether the declarant's language
conveys the declarant's impressions accurately); Snider, supra note 33, at 33637 (explaining that the narration concern exists because words have more
than one meaning or interpretation). Factors to consider include the declarant's sincerity, the ability of the declarant to convey the message, and the possibility of an honest mistake. See Snider, supra note 33, at 336-37; Laurence H.
Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARv. L. REv. 957, 958-61 (1974) (including
"insincerity" in the testimonial triangle).
For this consideration, the declarant's degree of intention is emphasized. See
MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 245, at 373-74; Morgan, supra note 39, at 185-88,
n.19 (discussing the problems associated with the improper use of the English
language). Cross-examination is vitally important to clarifY problems with the
declarant's language. See Morgan, supra note 39, at 186-88, n.19 (noting that a
witness could create a wrong impression through his word choice and that
cross-examination is necessary to reveal any such deception). Although many
writers couple this factor with the narration element, this Comment will consider them separately. Both concepts are important to understanding the
trustworthiness of statements in pursuit of medical treatment. Such statements
are often made while the declarant is in pain, without the use of certain
mental and physical faculties, or highly emotional. Therefore, while the declarant may be sincere, the statements nonetheless may be ambiguous.
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Although it could be argued that all hearsay statements should
be admitted, and that the credibility of such testimony should be
determined by the fact-finder,44 the rule against hearsay embodies
the courts' belief that out-of-court statements are inherently un trustworthy.45 Yet, even the common law recognized numerous exceptions to .the rule against hearsay.46 Under common law, courts admitted certain hearsay statements based on their inherent
trustworthiness47 or necessity,48 if the offeror of the hearsay statement met the burden of demonstrating the statement's admissibility.49 Aside from necessity,50 reasons for contemporary hearsay excep44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

See Milich, supra note 8, at 723 (citing 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 53640, 553 (1827»; Margaret Bull Kovera, et al., Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REv. 703, 719-22 (1992); Peter Miene, et ai., Jurur Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76
MINN. L. REv. 683, 693, 695, 699 (1992); Richard F. Rakos & Stephan Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future
Directions, 76 MINN. L. REv. 655, 664 (1992) (arguing that a fact-finder is capable of making determinations of credibility). Essentially, this scenario also occurs when a proponent proffers hearsay evidence to the court, and the opposing party fails to object to its admission. See Morgan, supra note 39, at 183
(describing the rule against hearsay as a viable protection only for those who
assert it). However, the jury may only use this evidence "within the bounds of
reason." Id. (footnote omitted).
See jee, supra note 26, at 563-66 (discussing the courts' belief in the critical importance of the rule against hearsay). But see Milich, supra note 8, at 767-74
(rejecting each of the historical justifications underlying the rule against hearsay).
See MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 245, at 375 (arguing that hearsay can often
be reliable and useful to the fact-finder and that there needs to be "liberaliz[ation of] evidence law"). The federal and state courts have imposed their
specific hearsay exceptions to the rule against hearsay through their respective
rules of evidence. See FED. R EVID. 801 (d), 803; 804;s 807; MD. R EVID. 5-802.l.
5-803. 5-804.
Under the common law, courts also considered the declarant's state of mind
and any motive to fabricate the statement when determining the statement's
admissibility. See Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 38, 536 A.2d 666, 684 (1988)
(describing the common law's consideration of the declarant's state of mind a
"sine qua non for every hearsay exception").
See Milich, supra note 8, at 726-27 (citing 5 WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 1420-23)
(noting that necessity applies when the declarant is unavailable and when
"the need for the evidence arguably outweighs the usual concerns about the
jury overvaluing hearsay evidence"). However, the author also observes: "As a
practical matter, most hearsay gets admitted through the many exceptions
and exemptions." Id. at 727.
See, e.g., Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 7-8, 536 A.2d 666, 669 (1988) (providing that the burden is on the proponent to show why the evidence should be
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tions 51 range from spontaneity52 to longevity53 to assumptions
regarding the behavior of public officials. 54
admitted, not on the opponent to show why it should be rejected).
See, e.g., FED. R EVID. 804(b) (2) (permitting dying declarations as substantive
evidence); accord MD. R EVID. 5-804(b)(2) (permitting dying declarations only
"[i]n a prosecution for an offense based upon unlawful homicide, attempted
homicide, assault with intent to commit a homicide or in any civil action.").
51. See LILLY, supra note 35, § 7.28, at 348 (noting that the human nature assumptions underlying hearsay exceptions are usually those of the courts, not of behavioral scientists).
52. See, e.g., 803 (1) (present sense impression); 803(2) (excited utterances);
s803(3) (then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition); accord MD. R
EVID. 5-803 (b) (1) (present sense impression); 5-803 (b) (2) (excited utterances); 5-803 (b) (3) (then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition).
See also LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE STATE AND FEDERAL, § 803(1).1 (West
1987) (discussing the history of the present sense impression exception that
Maryland did not adopt until 1985); § 803(2).1 (describing an excited utterance as one made as a result of an event "which is startling in nature" and
the requirement that the declarant was under stress at the time of the statement); § 803(3).1 (explaining the then existing mental or emotional condition exception).
53. See, e.g., FED. R. EVlD. 803(16) (ancient documents); MD. R. EVID. 5803(b) (16) (same); see also Dallas County v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 286
F.2d 388, 397-98 (5th Cir. 1961) (admitting a 58 year-old newspaper because of
its trustworthiness as opposed to the uncertainty of testimony that would require a 58 year-old recollection); Homewood Realty Corp. v. Safe Deposit &
Trust Co., 160 Md. 457, 473, 154 A. 58, 65 (1931) (finding a deed recorded
and delivered 40 years prior was trustworthy because of "its antiquity and nature"); McLAIN, supra note 52, § 803(16).1, § 803(16).2 (noting that Maryland,
like the majority of jurisdictions, does not recognize an exception for ancient
documents, but only an exception for "ancient deeds"). But see FED. R EVID.
803(16) (providing a hearsay exception for any document more than 20 years
old).
54. See, e.g., FED. R EVID. 803(8) (public records, reports); FED. R EVID. 803(10)
(absence of public record, entry); MD. R EVID. 5-803(b)(8) (public records,
reports); MD. R EVID. 5-803(b)(1O) (absence of public record, entry); see also
United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1335-37 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 827 (1999) (holding that the absence of the registration of a sawed off
shotgun with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms was admissible
with proper certification because the database from which it was absent had
sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness); United States v. Thompson, 420 F.2d
536, 545 (3d Cir. 1970) (finding no error in admitting an affidavit of an officer regarding the absence of any relevant entry); Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 612, 495 A.2d 348, 363-64 (1985) (reasoning that the
public records exception allows the admission of reliable facts); LYNN McLAIN,
MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE 260-61 (1994) (recognizing that this hearsay exception "permits proof of the absence of the record to be made by the certificate of the custodian").
50.
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B. The Hearsay Exception for Statements Made in Contemplation of Medical Treatment
The exception to the rule against hearsay for statements made
pursuant to medical treatment55 has four general dimensions. The
first dimension involves a patient's statements to a doctor regarding
a present bodily condition. 56 To ensure the trustworthiness of such
statements,57 courts rely on the patient's ability to recall events58 and
the patient's belief "that the effectiveness of the treatment depends
on the accuracy of the information provided to the doctor. "59 For
these statements, there is significant overlap between the medical
treatment hearsay exception and other recognized hearsay exceptions.60 The courts' acceptance of statements included in this di55.

56.
57.
58.

59.

60.

For example, Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-803 (b) (4) exempts from the rule
against hearsay:
Statements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in contemplation of treatment and describing medical history,
or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensation, or the inception or
general character of the cause or external sources thereof insofar as
reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of
treatment.
MD. R EVID. 5-803 (b) (4) .
See MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 277, at 430 (noting such statements are almost universally admitted for the truth of the matter asserted).
See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 277, at 430.
See MCLAIN, supra note 52, § 803(4).1 (noting that "there are no problems
with perception or memory" when courts admit statements of then existing
physical condition).
MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 277, at 430; see also Goldstein v. Sklar, 216 A.2d
298, 305 (Me. 1996) ("All ... declarations made by the patient to the examining physician as to his present or past symptoms are known by the patient
who is seeking medical assistance to be required for proper diagnosis and
treatment and by reason thereof, are viewed as highly reliable and apt to state
true facts."); see also McLAIN, supra note 52, § 803(4).1 (recognizing that there
are guarantees of trustworthiness with statements made for purposes of medical treatment); Jee, supra note 26, at 567 ("Statement[s] made in the course
of procuring medical services, where the declarant knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries special guarantees of
credibility." (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992»). For a discussion of White, see infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
For example, an individual sustaining a physical injury during a particularly
traumatic event may make a statement regarding her medical condition to a
physician. If the statement was made while under the stress of the event, Maryland courts will also admit such a statement under the excited utterance exception. See MD. R EVID. 5-803(b)(2); see also FED. R EVID. 803(2). If the statement described or explained an event during or immediately after its
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mension is a natural outgrowth of these other hearsay exceptions.
A second dimension of the medical treatment hearsay exception concerns statements of medical history.61 The common law
placed significant restrictions on the use of this evidence,62 but now,
if relevant, it is admissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 63 Again, courts rely on the patient's self-interest in obtaining
adequate medical treatment to ensure the statement's
trustworthiness. 64
The third dimension of the medical treatment hearsay exception involves statements made to a treating physician concerning
the cause or external source of a condition. 65 While courts rely on
the declarant's self-interest to ensure trustworthiness,66 many courts
inquire into the circumstances underlying the assertion, looking for

61.
62.

63.

64.
65.

66.

occurrence, Maryland courts would admit the statement as substantive evidence under the present sense impression hearsay exception. See MD. R EVID.
5-803 (b) (1); see also FED. R EVID. 803(1). Furthermore, if the statement relates
to the declarant's then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition and
is offered to prove that condition or the declarant's future action, Maryland
courts will invoke the corresponding hearsay exception. See Md. R Evid. 5803(b) (3) (providing a hearsay exception for then existing mental, emotional,
. or physical condition); see also FED. R EVID. 803(3).
See MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 277, at 430 (observing that the exception
evolved to include statements made by a patient regarding past symptoms).
See Paul R Rice, The Allure of the Illogic: A Coherent Solution for Rule 703 Requires
More than Redefining "Facts or Data," 47 MERCER L. REv. 495, 501, 501 n.26
(1996) (noting that the common law admitted such statements only if "history
and causation were crucial to the doctors' diagnosis and to an understanding
of the doctors' treatment" and never for the truth of the matter asserted)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
See id. at 502 (discussing federal rule 803(4)'s requirement that the evidence
be pertinent to the diagnosis of a medical condition and if so, admitted for
the truth of the matter asserted); see also MD. R EVID. 5-803(b)(4) (allowing
courts to admit statements describing past symptoms if reasonably pertinent
to treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment).
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See MD. R EVID. 5-803 (b) (4) (admitting statements that address "the inception
or general character of the cause or external sources" of the pain); MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 277, at 430-31 (recognizing that a major issue involving
the scope of the medical treatment exception is statements made to a doctor
regarding the cause of the condition). But see State v. Lima, 546 A.2d 770, 774
(RI. 1988) (excluding a father's statement that the babysitter submerged his
child in scalding water because the statement was not reasonably related to
treatment or diagnosis and would be highly prejudicial to the defendant babysitter) .
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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indications of insincerity or improper motive. 67
The last dimension, for which there is far less agreement, includes statements of past symptoms or medical history made to individuals other than a treating physician. 68 Under the traditional common law, courts admitted these statements only if they were made
to a treating physician in pursuit of treatment. 69 Common-law courts
reasoned that statements made to non-treating individuals lacked
the trustworthiness underlying the exception70 and that, unlike the
other three dimensions of the exception, the success of treatment
did not hinge on such statements to non-treating individuals.71 However, for several reasons, many modern courts admit statements
made to any individual in pursuit of treatment,n including statements made to the much maligned examining physician. 73

III. JURISDICTIONAL TREATMENT
A.

The Supreme Court of the United States
Despite Sixth Amendment14 concerns,75 the Supreme Court pro-

67.

68.
69.
70.

71.

72.
73.
74.

75.

See MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 277, at 431 (describing the test for admissibility to be whether the statements were reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment) .
Compare, e.g., infra note 208 with supra note 55.
See MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 278, at 431.
See id. § 277, at 431 (noting that as long as a statement is made by the patient
to secure treatment, the statement need not be made to a physician to be admissible).
Possible examples of non-treating individuals include physicians consulted in
preparation of litigation, see infra note 108 and accompanying text; individuals consulted merely for examination, see Wilhelm v. State Traffic Safety Comm 'n,
230 Md. 91, 97, 185 A.2d 715,717 (1962); and individuals who were consulted
for possible treatment but were subsequently determined to be unnecessary,
see Rnssello v. Friede~ 243 Md. 234, 24243, 220 A.2d 537, 54142 (1966).
See infra Part m.c and accompanying text.
See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides, in pertinent part: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Fourteenth Amendment extends such protections to state proceedings. See Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) (holding that Alaska's statute protecting anonymity of juvenile offenders effectively denied the petitioner his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-05 (1965) (holding that the Sixth Amendment's right
to confront witnesses is a fundamental right and is thus obligatory to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment).
See generally Bomjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987) ("While a literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause could bar the use of any out-
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tects the courts' ability to admit trustworthy hearsay evidence. 76 Although the Court in Ohio v. Roberts77 restricted the ability of a court
to admit hearsay statements from prior proceedings,18 it nonetheless
found no infringement of the Sixth Amendment by admitting statements made under "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions. 79 In Roberts,
the State, seeking a conviction for check forgery and possession of
stolen credit cards, sought to admit a declarapt's prior testimony
against the petitioner. 80 The Court held that the State normally had
to show the unavailability of the declarant and an "adequate 'indicia of reliability.' "81 However, the Court concluded that "[r] eliability
can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. "82 A firmly rooted excep-

76.

77.
78.

79.

80.

81.
82.

of-court statements when the declarant is unavailable, this Court has rejected
that view as 'unintended and too extreme.'" (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448
u.s. 56, 63 (1980»; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)
(" [T]here could be nothing more directly contrary to the letter of the provision in question than the admission of dying declarations.").
See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (rejecting the argument that
the Sixth Amendment requires the exclusion of all hearsay as it is too extreme); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847-48 (1990) ("[T]he [Confrontation] Clause permits, where necessary, the admission of certain hearsay
statements against a defendant despite the defendant's inability to confront
the declarant at trial.").
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-14 (1972) (dealing with the admission
of prior testimony under a hearsay exception) (citing California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 149-70 (1970»; Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 314-15 (1968) (per
curium); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 719-25 (1968).
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (concluding that when a hearsay declarant is not present, the Confrontation Clause requires a showing that he is unavailable and
that his statement is reliable).
See id. at 59-60 (laying out the underlying facts of the state's charges against
the petitioner). The declarant testified at a preliminary hearing that, despite
the claims of the petitioner, she had not given him permission to use her
credit cards or checks. See id. at 58 (pointing out the declarant was the only
witness at the preliminary hearing). The trial court could not ascertain the location of the declarant at the time of the trial and her mother testified that
she was unaware of her whereabouts. See id. at 59 (noting that five subpoenas
were issued to. the declarant's last known address).
[d. at 66.
[d. Statements not falling under a firmly rooted hearsay exception may nonetheless be admitted if there are" 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness'
drawn from the 'totality of the circumstances ... that surround the making of
the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief.'"
Carol A. Chase, Confronting Supreme Confusion: Balancing Defendants' Confrontation Clause Rights Against the Need to Protect Child Abuse Victims, 1993 UTAH L.
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tion allows proponents of hearsay statements to present such evidence without showing the unavailability of the declarant. 83
However, subsequent Supreme Court decisions created some
confusion as to the applicability of the Roberts test. In United States v.
Inadi,84 the Court seemed to abandon the Roberts test, focusing exclusively on the trustworthiness of the statement. 85 Distinguishing
the statements in Robert/'6 from those in Inadi, the Court found litde utility in determining the availability of the declarant.87 Although

83.
84.

85.

86.

87.

REv. 407, 411 (1993) (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 u.s. 805, 819-20 (1990)
(holding that admission of a child's hearsay statements violated the defendant's confrontation clause rights». For a discussion of what constitutes a
firmly rooted hearsay exception, see Wright, 497 u.s. at 817 ("Admission
under a firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfies the constitutional requirement of reliability because of the weight accorded longstanding judicial and
legislative experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain types of outof-court statements."); Myrna S. Raeder, Whites Effect on the Right to Confront
Ones Accuser, 7 CRIM. JUST. 2, 53-56 (1993) (questioning whether any federal
hearsay exception would ever not be considered a firmly rooted exception);
Nancy H. Baughan, Recent Development, White v. Illinois: The Confrontation
Clause and the Supreme Court's Preference for Out-of Court Statements, 46 VAND. L.
REv. 235, 261-62 (1993) (questioning whether the Court has ever defined
"firmly rooted").
Although there was some confusion concerning this result, subsequent case
law affirmed this conclusion. See infra note 84-89 and accompanying text.
475 U.S. 387 (1986). During the prosecution for conspiracy to manufacture
and distribute methamphetamines, the State sought to introduce lawfully obtained taped admissions of co-conspirators. See id. at 387-90.
See id. at 393-95. This development is especially remarkable given the requirements that must be satisfied by the proponents to use the co-conspirator hearsay statements as substantive evidence. See, e.g., FED. R EVID. 801 (d)(2) (E) (requiring a showing that the declarant is unavailable and that the statement was
made by a co-conspirator during, and in furtherance of, the conspiracy); MD.
R EvID. 5-803(a)(5).
Although the Roberts Court characterized the co-conspirator's prior testimony
as a "weaker substitute" for live testimony, the Inadi court concluded that a
co-conspirator's statement, made to another while the conspiracy was in process, would "derive its significance from the circumstances in which it was
made." Inadi, 475 u.s. at 395. According to the Inadi Court, the evidentiary
significance of the co-conspirator's statements would decrease, notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, if the prosecutor
called the co-conspirator to the stand to testify to the assertion. See id. at 396.
"Even when the declarant takes the stand, his in-court testimony seldom will
reproduce a significant portion of the evidentiary value of his statements during the course of the conspiracy." Id.
See id. at 396-400. But see Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (requiring a showing of unavailability and reliability for a hearsay statement to be admissible). Among
the proposal's flaws, the Court illuminated the lack of contribution to the
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the Court placed some restrictions on the use of hearsay evidence,88
this departure from Roberts opened the doors to the Court's decision in White v. Illinois. 89
In White,90 the Court specifically categorized statements made
for the purpose of receiving medical treatment as embodied in a
firmly rooted exception to the rule against hearsay.91 Citing the
trustworthiness inherent in such statements,92 the Court emphasized

88.

89.
90.

91.

92.

truth-finding process, lack of meaningful exclusion, availability of viable alternatives (such as the defendant compelling an available declarant to testifY at
trial through subpoena), and the practical, yet unnecessary burden such a requirement places on the prosecution. See Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394-400 (holding
that the Confrontation Clause does not embody an unavailability rule).
See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (holding the admission of a child's
hearsay statements violated the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights).
Convicted of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of 16 years, the
defendant contended that the trial court's admission of out-of-court statements made by the child to a doctor during an examination violated the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 812-13. Relying on Idaho's residual hearsayexception, the trial court admitted the doctor's testimony that the victim said:
"Daddy does this with me, but he does it a lot more with my sister than with
me." Id. at 811. Affirming the reversal of the respondent's conviction and concluding that the residual hearsay exception was not firmly rooted, the Court
sought sufficient indicia of reliability to overcome the Confrontation Clause's
provisions. See id. at 813, 817 (reasoning that the child's statements were not
automatically considered reliable because the residual hearsay exception was
not "firmly rooted"). The question of the witness's availability went unaddressed by the Court, however. See id. at 816. At trial, the defense counsel conceded that the victim was incapable of communicating with the jury and
failed to preserve this issue for review. See id. (assuming, without deciding,
that the younger daughter was an unavailable witness because the lower court
never discussed it or said otherwise).
502 U.S. 346 (1992).
Appealing his convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault, residential
burglary, and unlawful restraint, the petitioner contested the trial court's admission of hearsay statements by the four year old declarant through the testimony of her treating physician and attending nurse. See White, 502 U.S. at 34950. The trial court admitted the statements under Illinois's hearsay exception
for statements to medical personnel for diagnosis or treatment. See id. at 35051.
See id. at 357 (concluding that the evidence was admitted under a firmly
rooted hearsay exception and refusing to look for any guarantees of trustworthiness); if. Wright, 497 U.S. at 817 (concluding that Idaho's residual hearsay
exception was not firmly rooted and seeking particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness) .
According to the Court:
The rationale for permitting hearsay testimony regarding spontaneous declarations and statements made in the course of receiving
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that such hearsay statements had "special guarantees of credibility
that a trier of fact may not think replicated by courtroom testimony."93 Contrasting the trustworthiness of such assertions to those
involved in Roberts,94 the Court concluded that the admission of
such statements would not violate the Sixth Amendment, and affirmed its ruling in Roberts. 95 The Court reasoned that the trustworthiness of statements that fall within firmly rooted hearsay exceptions did not depend on the availability of the declarant. 96 As a
result, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the declarant must be present for admission of the hearsay statement,97
thereby allowing a party to introduce such a hearsay statement even
when the declarant is available. 98
Therefore, while .the Supreme Court discussed the constitutional complications posed by exceptions to the rule against hearsay,99 it deferred to the state courts to define the dimensions of
those exceptions. 1OO Absent federal court jurisdiction,101 it is a state's

93.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

medical care is that such out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness. But
those same factors that contribute to the statements' reliability cannot be recaptured even by later in-court testimony. A statement that
has been offered in a moment of excitement - without the opportunity to reflect on the consequences of one's exclamation - may justifiably carry more weight with a trier of fact than a similar statement
offered in the relative calm of the courtroom. Similarly, a statement
made in the course of procuring medical services, where the declarant knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries special guarantees of credibility that a trier of fact may
not think replicated by courtroom testimony.
White, 502 U.S. at 355-56 (footnote omitted).
[d. at 356. In making this determination, the Court also discussed the general acceptance of this hearsay exception in many state jurisdictions in the
United States. See id. at 355 n.B (observing that the exception is recognized in
nearly four-fifths of the States).
See id. at 356.
See id. at 356-57.
See id. at 357.
See id. at 354 (reiterating that there is "little benefit, if any, to be accomplished by imposing an 'unavailability rule' ").
See id.
See supra notes 74-98 and accompanying text.
See infra note 105.
See, e.g., United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368 (1980) (looking to the
House Conference Committee Report on the Federal Rules of Evidence to
conclude that federal privilege law must be applied in criminal cases in federal court and parenthetically explaining "the admissibility of evidence in
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rules of evidence that govern the admissibility of hearsay
statements. 102

B.

Evolution of the Maryland Medical Treatment Hearsay Exception

Maryland has long recognized the trustworthiness of statements
made to a physician pursuant to treatment,103 notwithstanding hearsay dangers. 104 In accord with much of the country,105 Maryland

102.

103.

104.

105.

criminal trials in the federal courts 'is to be controlled by common law principles, not by local statute' ") (quoting Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 13
(1934»; England v. Reinauer Transp. Cos., 194 F.3d 265, 273 (1st Cir. 1999)
(holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence determine the evidentiary aspects
of the collateral source rule of cases heard in federal court).
See MD. R EVlD. 5-101(a) (providing that the Maryland rules of evidence apply
to all actions and proceedings in state courts unless otherwise provided); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Sabghir, 350 Md. 67, 76, 710 A.2d 926, 931
(1998) (mentioning that attorney disciplinary proceedings are not exempted
from the rules of evidence); Key-EL v. State, 349 Md. 811, 816, 709 A.2d 1305,
1307 (1998) (noting that, in its order adopting the rules of evidence, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland provided that the rules would govern all actions); Graves v. State, 334 Md. 30, 36-37 n.2, 637 A.2d 1197, 1201 n.2 (1994)
(recognizing that after the rules of evidence took effect, they were to apply to
all trials and hearings); Walker v. State, 107 Md. App. 502, 518, 668 A.2d 990,
998 (1995) ("Maryland's codified rules of evidence were made applicable to
'all actions and proceedings in the courts of this State' with some exceptions."
(quoting MD. R EVlD. 5-101», a/I'd, 345 Md. 293, 691 A.2d 1341 (1996).
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
See Adams v. Benson, 208 Md. 261, 266-67, 117 A.2d 881, 883 (1955) (restating
the longstanding rule that an "attending physician may testify not only to
facts observed about the condition of an injured patient but also to statements made by the patient about his symptoms and feelings during examinations made with a view to treatment") (discussing Sellman v. Wheeler, 95 Md.
751, 54 A. 512, 514 (1902».
While most states have hearsay exceptions concerning information relayed to
medical professionals, very few differ from the language of the federal rule:
"Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations,
or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." FED. R EVID.
803(4). Twenty seven states have adopted the language of the federal rule verbatim. See ALA. R EVID. 803(4) (explaining in the Committee Notes that,
"Rule 803(4) supersedes prior Alabama authority to the effect that a physician
could not relate statements made during a consultation held solely for the
purpose of enabling the physician to testify"); ALAsKA R EVlD. 803 (4), construed in Smiley v. State, No. A-6130, 1998 WL 90897, at *3 n.1 (Alaska App.
March 4, 1998) (unpublished) (holding that the motive of the declarant must
coincide with the rationale behind Rule 803(4)-the declarant's statements
must be motivated by the need to give truthful information in furtherance of
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diagnosis or treatment); ARIz. R EVID. 803(4), reviewed by State v. Robinson,
735 P.2d 801, 809 (Ariz. 1987) (explaining the rationales behind both the federal rule and the Arizona rule as identical); ARK. R EVID. 803(4), analyzed in
Collins v. Hinton, 937 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Ark. 1997) (determining that testimony given by either a treating or examining physician regarding medical
treatment or diagnosis is admissible); COLO. R EVID. 803(4), reviewed in People
v. King, 765 P.2d 608, 609 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the declarant's
motive in making the statements to a non-treating physician must be consistent with the rationale of the rule before they may be admitted); CONN. R
EVID. 803(4), construed in George v. Ericson, 736 A.2d 889, 896 (Conn. 1999)
(holding that treating physicians and physicians retained for trial may testify);
DEL R EVID. 803(4) (stating that "Rule 803(4) ... tracks F.RE." in the historical notes); HAw. R EVID. 803 (b) (4) (providing that, "[t]his exception, which
is identical with FED. R EVID. 803(4), liberalizes the common law rule that admitted only statements made for the purpose of medical treatment" in the
commentary accompanying the rule); IND. R EVID. 803(4), construed in McClain v. State, 675 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind. 1996) (holding that the declarant's
motivation for seeking diagnosis or treatment must coincide with the rule's rationale); IOWA R EVID. 803(4), reviewed in State v. Tracy, 482 N.W.2d 675, 681
(Iowa 1992) (providing that the declarant's motive must be consistent with
the rationale of Rule 803(4), thereby alleviating the risk of untruthful statements); Ky. R EvlD. 803(4), explained in Drumm v. Commonwealth, 783 S.W.2d
380, 384-85 (Ky. 1990) (adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), thereby
eliminating the distinction between examining and treating physicians); ME.
R EVID. 803(4) (adopting the federal rule's language verbatim); MINN. STAT.
ANN. R EVID. 803(4) (adding that there is no longer a distinction between
treating and examining physicians in the advisory committee notes); MONT. R
EVID. 803(4) (adopting the federal rule verbatim), construed in State v. Arlington, 875 P.2d 307, 316 (Mont. 1994) (holding that the motive of the declarant
in making the statement must be to seek medical treatment); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 27-803(3) (adopting the federal rule verbatim), explained in Vacanti v. Masters Elecs. Corp., 514 N.W.2d 319, 324 (Neb. 1994) ("At the heart of this hearsay exception lies statements made by a patient to a treating physician."); NEV.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 51.115, reviewed in Felix v. State, 849 P.2d 220, 249 (Nev.
1993) (deciding that the statements must be necessary for treatment or diagnosis, and not made for investigation purposes); N.M. R EVID. 11-803(D), analyzed in In re Esperanza M., 955 P.2d 204, 207"{)8 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (considering it immaterial whether an examination was part of an investigation, as
long as it was for diagnosis and treatment); N.C. GEN. STAT. R EVID. 803(4), explained in State v. Stafford, 346 S.E.2d. 463, 467 (N.C. 1986) (holding that if
the sale purpose of the physician's examimltion is for testimony at trial, statements made by the declarant are inadmissible because they lack reliability);
N.D. R EVID. 803(4) (detailing in the explanatory note accompanying the
state rules that the rules were adopted from the federal rules); OHIO R EVID.
803(4) (observing that the rule "extends the common law doctrine to admit
statements made to a physician without regard to the purpose of the examination or need for the patient's history" in the accompanying commentary); OR.
REv. STAT. R EVID. 803(4), analyzed in State v. Logan, 806 P.2d 137, 139 (Or.
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Ct. App. 1991) (pointing out that the rule is based on the belief that the
statements will be truthful and reliable when a patient is seeking diagnosis or
treatment); TEX. R EVID. 803(4), explained in Syndex Corp. v. Dean, 820 S.W.2d
869, 873 (Tex. App. 1991) (providing that the statements do not have to be
made to a physician, so long as they are made for medical treatment); UTAH
R EVID. 803(4), explained in Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 256 (Utah 1998)
(characterizing this exception as "the 'treating physician' exception"); WASH.
R. EVID. 803(a)(4) (providing that "[s]tatements made to a treating or nontreating physician . . . [may be admitted] for the purpose of proving the
truth of the matter asserted" in the accompanying commentary); W. VA. R
EVID. 803(4), reviewed in State v. Edward, 398 S.E.2d 123, 136 (W. Va. 1990)
('" [T]he declarant's motive in making the statement must be consistent with
the purposes of promoting treatment.'''); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 908.03(4) (1999),
explained in Thompson v. Nee, 107 N.W.2d 150, 152 (Wis. 1961) (forbidding
admission of statements made to a doctor solely employed for testimony);
WYO. R EvlD. 803(4) (adopting verbatim the language of the federal rule without any commentary as to whether a distinction is made between an examining or treating physician).
Additionally, while not adopting the language of Federal Rule 803(4) verbatim, 10 states have adopted the spirit of the Federal Rule. See F1A. STAT. ANN. §
90.803(4) (admitting "[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment by a person seeking the diagnosis ar treatment, ar made by an individual
who has knowledge of the facts and is legally responsible far the person who is unable to
communicate the facts, which statements describe medical history") (emphasis added); GA. R EVID. CODE § 24-34 (permitting that statements made, "as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment shall be admissible in evidence") (emphasis added); IDAHO R EVID. 803(4) (adopting the text of Federal Rule
803(4), but omitting the phrase, "or the inception or general character of the
cause or external"), construed in State v. Moore, 965 P.2d 174, 182-83 (Idaho
1998) (holding that examining as well as treating physicians may testify); MISS.
R EVID. 803(4) (permitting the admission of statements made: "insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, regardless of to whom the statements
a111 made, ar when the statements are made, if the court, in its discretion, affirmatively
finds that the proffered statements were made under circumstances substantially indicating their trustworthiness" and defining the term 'medical" to include "emotional and mental health as well as physical health") (emphasis added); N.H.
R EVID. 803(4) (adopting the test of Federal Rule 803(3) and adding that the
statement may be admitted, "regardless of to whom the statements are made, ar
when the statements are made, if a court, in its discretion, affirmatively finds that the
proffered statements were made under circumstances indicating their trustworthiness")
(emphasis added); NJ. R EVID. 803(c) (4) (adding that the statement must be
made "in good faith"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2803(4) (admitting
"[s] tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain or sensations, if
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment"), analyzed in Kennedy v. State,
839· P.2d 667, 670 (Okla. Grim. App. 1992) (adopting the two-part test used by
many other jurisdictions: that the declarant's motive must be consistent with
receiving medical care and that it was reasonable for the doctor to rely on the
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courts generally admit hearsay statements regarding symptoms and
feelings made by a patient seeking medical treatment. 106 Like the
infonnation to diagnose or treat); S.G R EVID. 803(4) (allowing admission of
statements made for purposes of medical treatment); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 1916-8 (providing admissibility of the statements "even though the declarant is
available as a witness"); VT. R EVID. 803(4) (permitting the admission of
"[s] tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. and
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations
[are not excluded as hearsay]").
Six states make a distinction between treating and examining physicians with
regard to the admissibility of hearsay. See KAN. Cw. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60460(1) ("unless the judge finds it was made in bad faith, a statement of the
declarant's ... previous symptoms, pain or physical sensation, made to a physician consulted for treatment for diagnosis with a view to treatment, and relevant to an issue of declarant's bodily condition" is admissible) (emphasis added); 2 LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 803(4) (providing the statement must be
made in connection with treatment); MICH. R EVID. 803 (4) (providing the
statement must be made in connection with treatment and necessary to diagnosis and treatment); PA. R EVID. 803(4) (distinguishing in the comment that
the Pennsylvania rule differs from the federal rule because "[s] tatements
made to persons retained solely for the purpose of litigation are not admissible under this rule"); RI. R EVID. 803(4) (excluding statements "made to a
physician consulted solely for the purposes of preparing for litigation or obtaining testimony for trial"); TENN. R EVID. 803(4) (providing in the advisory
commission comment that "[t]he declaration must be for both diagnosis and
treatment").
Finally, 6 states have not adopted any fonnal rules regarding the admissibility of statements made to physicians offered for the truth of the matter stated.
SeeJohnson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 484,487 (1963) (holding that
statements made to physicians regarding the cause of injury for purposes of
diagnosis are admitted to show basis of opinion, but not for truth of matter
asserted); Borowicz v. Seuring Transit Co., 240 N.E.2d 314, 319 (Ill. App. Ct.
1968) (citing the common-law exception to the rule against hearsay for statements made to physicians in the course of diagnosis or treatment.) Commonwealth v. Costello, 582 N.E.2d 938, 941 (Mass. 1991) (recognizing the common-law exception to the hearsay rule if statements are made for the purpose
of obtaining medical treatement) (citing P J. LIAcos, MAssACHUSETTS EVIDENCE
346 (5th ed. 1981»; State v. Evans, 992 S.W.2d 275, 283 n.6 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999) (admitting statements made to treating psychiatrists under the common-law exception to the hearsay rule); State v. Bailey, 675 N.YS.2d 706, 708
(N.Y App. Div. 1998) (determining that statements contained in hospital
records may be admissible under the guise of the business records exception
if they are gennane to medical treatment); Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 492
S.E.2d 131, 134 (Va. 1997) (statip.g that Virginia has not adopted a rule similar
to Federal Rule 803(4) and declining to adopt a similar rule judicially in a
child molestation case).
106. See, e.g., Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 25, 536 A.2d. 666, 678 (1988) (observing that most jurisdictions have admitted statements of then existing medical.
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Supreme Court, Maryland courts emphasize the declarant's/patient's underlying motivation of self-preservation, which guarantees
the accuracy of statements made to treating physicians. 107
Unlike many jurisdictions, however, Maryland differentiates
statements made to examiningl08 physicians from those made to
treating lO9 physicians. 110 The court of appeals considered this distinction in Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund. 11l In Candella, the plaintiff,
a maid, sought recovery for an electric shock she received while attempting to turn off her employer's vacuum.ll2 Bringing her claim
before the Workmen's Compensation Committee, the plaintiff of-

107.

108.

109.

110.

111.
112.

conditions made to doctors because of the additional guarantee of trustworthiness); Adams v. Benson, 208 Md. 261, 267, 117 A.2d 881, 883 (1955) (stating, among other things, that a doctor may testify to a patient's statements as
to injury, symptoms, and feelings).
See, e.g., Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 26, 536 A.2d at 678 ("[N]o one would willingly risk medical injury as a result of improper treatment by withholding ll(!Cessary data or furnishing false data to the physician who would determine the
course of treatment on the basis of that data.").
Traditionally, an examining physician is a medical professional consulted primarily to qualify as an expert for litigation. See MCLAIN, supra note 52, § .
2.803(p), at 255. Some courts have also referred to examining physicians as
non-treating physicians. See generaUy Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 28, 536 A.2d at
679 (1988) ("Maryland exempted from the evidentiary imprimatur statements
made to a non-treating physician, such as an expert wimess preparing testimony for trial.") (citing Parker v. State, 189 Md. 244, 249, 55 A.2d 784, 786
(1947». For consistency and clarity, this Comment will use the term examining physicians.
As the name implies, a treating physician is one who actually performs treatment or to whom individuals describe their ailments in order to facilitate
treatment. Therefore, any statements that are reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment are admissible. See MD. R
EVID. 5-803 (b) (4) (admitting statements "made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in contemplation of treatment"); MCLAIN, supra
note 52, § 2.803(p), at 255 (pointing out that Maryland case law distinguishes
between statements for purposes of treatment and those made for purposes of
diagnosis or "for litigation). However, such statements may also be admissible
if the statement was made by a patient's "loved one" or, in the case of a
child, by a parent. See id. § 2.803.4(q), at 256 (showing that the rules committee rejected the idea of limiting the rule to statements made only to health
care providers).
Notwithstanding the rule against hearsay, Maryland's rules of evidence leave
significant alternatives to the skillful practitioner looking to admit hearsay
made to an examining physician. See infra Part IV.A and accompanying text;
see also infra Part III.C.
277 Md. 120, 353 A.2d 263 (1976).
See id. at 122, 353 A.2d at 264.
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fered the expert testimony of a non-treating psychiatrist she visited
in preparation of litigation,113 along with hearsay statements she
made during the examination. 114 The trial court overturned the
Worker's Compensation Commission's decision to admit the testimony,115 and the court of appeals, granting certiorari prior to consideration of the case by the court of special appeals, affirmed the
trial court's ruling. 116
The court of appeals concluded that statements made to examining physicians lack the indicia of reliability accompanying those
made to a treating physician. ll7 Although recognizing that other jurisdictions disagree with its perspective,118 the court refused to deviate from its "more restrictive rule" of complete exclusion of hearsay
statements made to examining physicians. 119 Discussing several indicators of untrustworthiness,120 the court paid particular attention
to the underlying purpose of the examination, commenting, "that
appellant related the history to the psychia~st knowing that it was
113. See id. at 122, 126, 353 A.2d at 264, 267 (noting that the plaintiff called a psychiauist that she had been referred to by her attorney, but who never treated
her).
114. See id. at 126, 353 A.2d at 267 (observing that "the statements on which the
physician's conclusions were based cannot withstand the close scrutiny of
hearsay testimony").
115. See id. at 123, 353 A.2d at 265 (explaining that the uial court struck the testimony because it was based on the case history supplied by the patient for the
purpose of qualifying the doctor as an expert rather than for obtaining treatment).
116. See id. at 121-22, 353 A.2d at 264.
117. See id. at 124, 353 A.2d at 265-66.
118. See id. at 124, 353 A.2d at 266. The court discussed that other jurisdictions allow a non-treating doctor to testity as to the history received from a patient
and the conclusions made therefrom. See id. (citing Adams v. Benson, 208 Md.
261, 267-69, 117 A.2d 881, 883-84 (1955». However, the Maryland courts consider such statements as untrustworthy because the patient knows that the
statements "are being received primarily to enable the physician to prepare
testimony on his behalf rather than for purposes of diagnosis and treatment."
Id. at 124, 353 A.2d at 265-66.
119. See id. (recognizing that there has been some criticism of Maryland's rule)
(citing Adams, 208 Md. at 267-69, 117 A.2d at 883-84); see also Parker v. State,
189 Md. 244, 249, 55 A.2d 784, 786 (1947) (discussing Maryland's exclusion of
hearsay statements made by litigants to non-treating physicians for the purpose of qualifying a doctor as an expert).
120. See Candella, 277 Md. at 126, 353 A.2d at 267 (discussing the low probative
value of the evidence, the subjective knowledge of the plaintiff that no treatment would be rendered, and the nature of the expert's conclusions in light
of his discipline).
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merely for the purpose of qualifying him as a witness on her behalf
. . . . Clearly, the statements on which the physician's conclusions
were based cannot withstand the close scrutiny of hearsay testimony
mandated by our prior decisions. "121
One year later, however, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
modified this exception in Beahm v. ShortalL 122 Again, as in Candella,
the court considered the admissibility of hearsay statements made to
an examining physician. l23 To determine liability for a collision between the plaintiff's car and the defendant's tractor, the plaintiff offered the expert testimony of a neurosurgery specialist he visited
four years after the accident. l24 The plaintiff's visit to the specialist
was solely to qualify him as an expert for litigation. l25 Nonetheless,
the trial court admitted the physician's hearsay statements concerning the patient's symptoms as substantive evidence. 126
Had the court of appeals in Beahm followed Candella, the opposite result would have ensued; the trial court would have committed
reversible error by admitting the evidence. 127 Instead, the court of
appeals adopted a new rule. l28 The court held that a doctor who examines a patient solely to qualify as an expert may not only testify
as to his medical conclusions, but may also testify about the history
relayed by the patient if that information formed the basis of the
physician's conclusion. 129 Although the court admitted the doctor's
conclusions as substantive evidence, the Beahm court only admitted
the patient's hearsay statements with a qualifying charge to the jury;
those statements could only be considered as an explanation of the
basis for the conclusions, rather than for the truth of the matter
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

[d.
279 Md. 321, 368 A2d 1005 (1977).
See id. at 323, 368 A2d at 1007.
See id. at 328, 368 A2d at 1009-10.
See id.
See id. at 328, 368 A2d at 1010.
See Candella v. Subsequent I~ury Fund, 277 Md. 120, 126, 353 A2d 263, 267
(1976) (holding that the statements on which the physician's conclusions were
based were inadmissible).
128. Although the court took a broader approach than it had in Candella, it recognized that there are even more expansive approaches used in other jurisdictions and in the federal courts, under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See id. at
327 n.5, 368 A.2d at 1009 n.5 (refusing to reach as far as the federal rule by
allowing the medical history given by a patient to a non-treating physician to
be admissible as substantive evidence). For the text of Federal Rule 803(4),
see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
129. See Beahm, 279 Md. at 327, 368 A2d at 1009.
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asserted. 130
Applying this new rule, the court of appeals held that the trial
court committed error by admitting the evidence.l31 Yet, even
though the trial court failed to instruct the jury with a qualifying
charge as to those statements,132 the judgment of the trial court was
nonetheless affirmed because the court of appeals considered the
error harmless.133
As Maryland courts began admitting statements which formed
the basis of an examining physician's expert opinion, the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland reinforced the narrowness of the medical treatment hearsay exception in Cassidy v. State. 134 There, three
days after a child was allegedly abused, a representative of Child
Protective Services brought the victim to a physician for examination.135 Recognizing several signs of child abuse, the doctor repeatedly asked the victim to identifY the perpetrator of the acts.136 The
child responded "Daddy" on all five occasions, and the court concluded that the defendant, the boyfriend of the victim's mother was
the person to whom the child referred. 137
While conceding the admissibility of statements concerning the
cause or external source of a condition as a hearsay exception,138
the court excluded the victim's identification 139 of her mother's boyfriend as the abuser and reversed his conviction for child abuse and
130. See id.
131. See id. at 329, 368 A.2d at 10tO.
132. See id. The court conceded that the plaintiff could have elicited such evidence
through a hypothetical. See id. at 329 n.7, 368 A.2d at 1010 n.7 (citing Rosello
v. Friedel, 243 Md. 234, 242, 220 A.2d 537, 541 (1966) (citing Wilhelm v. State
Traffic Comm'n, 230 Md. 91, 97, 185 A.2d 715,717 (1962»). For a discussion
of this technique and how it can be used to circumvent the rule against hearsay, see infra Part IV.A.
133. See id. at 332, 368 A.2d at 1012 ("The testimony of Dr. Russo which was admitted in error ... was not 'substantially injurious' so as to have a prejudicial effect on the outcome of the case.").
134. 74 Md. App. 1,8-9,536 A.2d 666, 669-70 (1988).
135. See id. at 6, 536 A.2d at 668.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 5, 7, 536 A.2d at 668, 669.
138. See id. at 26, 536 A.2d at 678 (citing Fisher Body Div. v. Alston, 252 Md. 51, 5455, 249 A.2d 130, 132-33 (1969); Riddle v. Dickens, 241 Md. 579,581, 217 A.2d
304, 306 (1966».
139. However, "[w]hen there is a danger that an assault victim may have contracted a communicable disease, of course, the identity of the assailant may
take on significant medical pertinence." Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 34 n.14, 536
A.2d at 682 n.14.
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criminal assault. l40 Focusing on the subjective knowledge of the declarant,t41 the court concluded: "[o]nce the perceived end purpose
of the examination moves beyond the medical treatment of a physical ailment, the reason for this particular exception ceases to exist
the fear that a doctor will do a wrong and harmful thing to the declarant's body. "142
The Cassidy court criticized the practice of admitting statements
made to examining physicians as substantive evidence because these
admissions disregarded the declarant's subjective intent,143 minimized guarantees of trustworthiness accompanying such statements,l44 and made "nonsensical distinctions between the doctor's
recommendation as to social disposition and the social worker's recommendation as to the same thing on the same facts."145
In contrast to Cassidy, in In re Rachel T.,146 the court of special
appeals vacated the trial court's decision not to admit the victim's
statements made to a social worker, and remanded the case to the
trial court to consider the statements. 147 In that case, the State suspected the victim's father abused her.l48 Finding several signs of possible sexual abuse, the child's attending physician referred her to a
140. See id. at 50, 536 A.2d at 690.
141. See id. at 29, 536 A.2d at 680 (discussing the doctor's inability to know the
child's subjective understanding of the examination).
142. Id. at 34, 536 A.2d at 682.
143. See id. at 43-46, 536 A.2d at 686-88 (discussing United States v. Renville, 779
F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985». The Cassidy court concluded that, by admitting
statements made to examining physicians as substantive evidence, the Renville
court ignored the declarant's subjective belief, resulting in the hearsay exception's departure from its common-law origin. See Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 44-45,
536 A.2d 687-88.
144. See id. at 43, 536 A.2d at 686 (criticizing the Renville court for making "medical
pertinence" the "key" issue). According to the Cassidy court, the federal approach hinges on the assumption that, "[s] ince doctors may be assumed not
to want to waste their time with unnecessary history, the fact that a doctor
took the information is prima facie evidence that it was pertinent." Id. at 47,
536 A.2d at 688; see also id. at 47, 536 A.2d at 688-89 (criticizing the conclusion
in People v. Wilkins, 349 N.W.2d 815, 817 (Mich. App. 1984) that "facts reliable
enough to serve as a basis for medical diagnosis are also reliable enough to
escape the hearsay proscription ... "). Disagreeing with this perspective, the
court maintained Maryland's common-law position of the difference between
a court's reliance on hearsay and an expert's reliance on hearsay, finding no "
necessity to equate the two. See id. at 47, 536 A.2d at 689.
145. Id. at 49, 536 A.2d at 689.
146. 77 Md. App. 20, 549 A.2d 27 (1988).
147. See id. at 40, 549 A.2d at 37.
148. See id. at 27, 549 A.2d at 30.
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pediatric gynecologist. 149 Unwilling to speak to the gynecologist, the
child spoke to a female social worker in his office, claiming that she
had a "secret" with her father "and that if she told her Mom her father would be in big trouble."150 Extending the medical treatment
hearsay exception to the social worker, lSI the court concluded that
Rachel's comments should have been admitted as substantive
evidence .152
Although affirming Cassidy's emphasis on the subjective belief
of the declarant,153 the court nonetheless distinguished the two
cases. 154 Unlike Cassidy,155 the Rachel T. court concluded that the
cognitive development of the nearly five year old victim allowed her
to comprehend the gravity of the situation. 156 To bolster this conclusion, the court further relied on the sophistication of the child's
statementl57- the child understood the concept of a secret, the importance of keeping it,15S and the severity of the situation. 159 Furthermore, the social worker explained the consequences of Rachel's
statements. 160 When meeting with Rachel, the social worker explained the reason for the pediatric gynecologist'S examination,161
noting that the doctor would treat her in accordance with the infor149.
150.
151.
152.

153.
154.
155.

156.

157.

158.
e

159.

160.
161.

See id. at 24-25, 549 A.2d at 29.
[d. at 25, 549 A.2d at 30.
See id. at 33, 549 A.2d at 33.
See id. at 36, 549 A.2d at 35 (holding that the trial court erroneously excluded
the statements).
See id. at 34, 549 A.2d at 34 (characterizing the belief of the declarant as "vitally important").
See id. at 33-36, 549 A.2d at 33-35.
See id. at 34, 549 A.2d at 34 (noting that the Cassidy declarant was two years
old).
See id. at 35, 549 A.2d at 34 (noting the probability that Rachel was frightened
at the unexplained appearance of blood in her panties, resulting in her ability
to recognize her own physical self-interest and understand that her statements
would be used to provide medical treatment); see also lee, supra note 26, at
568 n.69 (recognizing that Maryland courts make case-by-case determinations
using the age of the declarant as a factor in determining cognitive development).
See Rachel T., 77 Md. App. at 35, 549 A.2d at 34 ("The content of Rachel's
statement itself indicates a certain degree of sophistication.").
Cf Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 6, 536 A.2d 666, 668 (1988) (noting that,
in response to inquiries about the perpetrator, the child said, "Daddy").
Compare Rachel T., 77 Md. App. at 23-24, 549 A.2d at 29 (describing the child's
vaginal bleeding), with Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 6, 536 A.2d at 668 (describing
the child's three day-old bruises).
See Rachel T., 77 Md. App. at 35, 549 A.2d at 34.
See id. In Cassidy, no such explanation took place.
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mation she conveyed. 162
The court also relied on a footnote in Cassidy 63 to distinguish
the two cases. l64 The Rachel T. court noted that the evidence of
abuse in Cassidy was external and not indicative of the transmission
of a communicable disease. 165 In contrast, Rachel faced the possibility of contracting a communicable disease given the nature of the
evidence of abuse. 166
The Rachel T. court also concluded that the victim's pediatric
gynecologist, who performed no treatment but referred Rachel to a
social worker, nonetheless qualified as a treating physician. 167 Given
the victim's impetus for visiting the doctor,168 and the physician's
need for an accurate medical history for effective treatment,169 the
court concluded that the hearsay declarations were fully admissible. 170 Therefore, although the treating physician remembered seeing the victim only once,171 and the statement was made to a social
worker referred by the witness, rather than directly to the physician,172 the court determined the trial court erroneously excluded
the statements. 173
162. See id. Therefore, this notification ensures that the traditional guarantee of
trustworthiness underlying this exception to the rule against hearsay is present; the declarant is informed that her statements will affect the success of
the impending medical treatment. For a discussion of this consideration, see
supra note 59.
163. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
164. See Rachel T., 77 Md. App. at 36, 549 A.2d at 35.
165. See id. at 34-35, 549 A.2d at 34.
166. See id. at 36, 549 A.2d at 35.
167. See id. at 35, 549 A.2d at 35 (" [The pediatric gynecologist] was a 'treating'
physician because Rachel's regular pediatrician referred Rachel and her parents in order to ascertain the cause of Rachel's bleeding.").
168. The court specifically noted that the victim did not meet with the pediatrician
in preparation of litigation. See id. at 35, 549 A.2d at 35.
169. See id. at 36, 549 A.2d at 35. The court pointed out that "[a]scertaining the
identity of the abuser was also important . . . because effective treatment
might have required Rachel's removal from the home." [d.
170. See id. at 33, 549 A.2d at 33 (determining that the statements were admissible
under the medical treatment and business record exceptions to the rule
against hearsay).
171. See id. at 36, 549 A.2d at 35.
172. See id. The court emphasized that this interdisciplinary approach was common
practice in the office and that the gynecologist relied directly on statements
made to social workers in making his diagnosis and prescribing treatment. See
id.

173. See id.
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In Low v. State,174 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
muddied the distinction between treating and examining physicians
by reversing the petitioner's convictions for second-degree rape, second-degree sexual offense, and child abuse because the trial court
admitted the victim's hearsay statements made to a child abuse expert. 175 At trial, the victim reluctantly testified that, the "appellant
touched her in a 'private part' in the 'front' and in the 'back,' and
that he 'stuck something into me,' which hurt."176 A pediatrician
and child abuse expert examined the twelve year old victim and
concluded, based on the physical evidence, that someone abused
the child.177 During the examination, the child stated that the appellant "put his penis in her vagina and in her 'butt' more than ten
times."178 In response, the appellant contended that the allegation
resulted from his disciplining the child. 179 On cross-examination, the
child admitted several lies, including at least one concerning the appellant. lso A jury found the appellant guilty of all three offenses and
sentenced him to fIfty-fIve years of incarceration. 18l
The court of appeals concluded that the doctor was an examining physician.1 82 Therefore, according to the court, the jury could
not consider the doctor's recitation of hearsay statements as substantive evidence. 183 Describing her as essentially a "part of the prosecution team,"I84 the court found reversible error in the trial court's
119 Md. App. 413, 705 A.2d 67, cert. denied, 350 Md. 278, 711 A.2d 870 (1998).
See id. at 416-17, 705 A.2d at 68-{59.
Id. at 416, 705 A.2d at 69.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 416-17, 705 A.2d at 69.
See Low, 119 Md. App. at 425, 705 A.2d at 73. The dissent, however, noted
there was evidence that, had the child required treatment, the doctor would
have administered it, and that the trial court accordingly found sufficient indicia of a treating physician under Maryland Rule 5-803(4). See id. at 428-32,
705 A.2d at 75-76 (Alpert, j., dissenting). The m~ority emphasized that although the doctor comprehensively reviewed the child's physical health (Le.
by examining eyes, ears, nose, and skeletal system), the Department of Social
Services referred the child for a complete medical examination, rather than
treatment. See id. at 423, 705 A.2d at 72 (revealing the physician's subjective
belief as to the purpose of the examination). But see id. at 424, 705 A.2d at 72
(labeling the subjective belief of the doctor as "immaterial").
183. See id. at 420, 705 A.2d at 70.
184. Id. at 425, 705 A.2d at 73. In effect, the court equated statements to a social
worker or pediatric gynecologist with statements made to physicians that are

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
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unlimited admission of the victim's statements. ISS
In doing so, the court emphasized the absence of evidence
tending to show the child's awareness of the importance of the
medical examination. 186 According to the court, this lack of awareness would not create the impression that the doctor would be rendering treatment. 187 Thus, the court concluded that the victim did
not contemplate treatment when she advised her physician. 188
Rather than affirming the factual conclusions of the trial court,189
the court reasoned that:
A child of twelve years, who has never before been seen by
a doctor (and will never again be seen by this doctor), who
is poked at and prodded in virtually every area of her body,
and who is asked a multitude of questions, some quite sensitive in nature, is most likely, at the very least, an extremely
intimidated little girl, who has little grasp of why she was
sent to this strange doctor in a strange setting. If anything,

185.
186.

187.

188.

189.

consulted solely in preparation of litigation with regard to the lack of nustworthiness Maryfund courts find in hearsay.
See id. at 426, 705 A.2d at 73-74.
See id. at 422, 705 A.2d at 72. But see id. at 428, 705 A.2d at 74-75 (Alpert, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the standard procedure of the doctor was to discuss
the importance of the examination with the patient and that, at trial, the doctor testified that "[s)he had no reason to think she had done otherwise with
[the victim]").
See id. at 424, 705 A.2d at 73. One should note, however, that when a trial
court considers the admissibility of statements made to a treating physician in
pursuit of treatment, it does not make a separate consideration of whether
the patient subjectively did conclude or reasonably should have concluded
that the success of her treatment hinged on the veracity of her statements.
But see id. at 413, 425, 705 A.2d 67, 73 (1998); In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20,
34, 549 A.2d 27, 34 (1988); Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 29, 536 A.2d 666,
680 (1988) (stating that a patient's subjective purpose is "vitally important").
But see Low, 119 Md. App. at 433-34, 705 A.2d at 77 (Alpert, J., dissenting). In
his dissent, Judge Paul Alpert noted that a litigant may prove subjective purpose, like intent or motive, through extrinsic evidence if direct and objective
proof does not exist. See id. (Alpert, J., dissenting). Therefore, because Judge
Alpert emphasized Janine's consciousness throughout the examination, he did
not discuss her subjective belief with her doctor. See id. (Alpert J., dissenting).
Given the extent of the examination, he believed the court could draw an
equally permissible inference that she fully understood that the examination
exceeded an examination for sexual abuse. See id. (Alpert J., dissenting). But
see id. at 424, 705 A.2d at 73 (characterizing such possible treatment rendered
as "incidental and secondary to [the physician's] primary role as a forensic
examiner") .
But see supra note 14.
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[the victim] had a right to be downright SUSpICIOUS as to
why the doctor was examining her in body areas other than
those stemming from the complained of incident, and that,
in our opinion, would have promoted [the victim] 's distrust
of and perhaps dishonesty with the doctor much more than
it would have facilitated a relationship of truSt. I90
In so concluding, the Low court apparently followed the restrictiveness of Cassidy,191 even though there were factual similarities to
Rachel T.192 For instance, one of the major concerns in Cassidy was
the victim's young age and possible inability to understand the
cause-and-effect relationship between statements to a doctor and the
ensuing treatment. 193 Conversely, the court in Rachel T. seemed to
emphasize the ability of that particular five year old victim to understand the importance of the statements in her treatment. 194 Therefore, to be consistent with Maryland case law, without reversing its
own decision in Rachel T., the court of special appeals should have
recognized that the twelve year old victim in Low realized the gravity of the examination and hence, appreciated the cause-and-effect
relationship between her statements and treatment. Although the
court concluded otherwise,195 being poked and prodded "in virtually
every area of her body" would likely indicate such gravity to even
the most "intimidated little girl."
Yet, rather than concentrating on the child's ability to understand the purpose underlying the treatment, the Low court highlighted the victim's inclination to deceive the physician. 196 Notwithstanding the victim's likely understanding of the situation's
190. Low, 119 Md. App. at 424-25, 705 A.2d at 73.
191. For a discussion of Cassidy, see supra notes 134-45 and accompanying text.
While the Low majority agreed there were factual dissimilarities between Low
and Cassidy, the court found the victim's reticence to testify in Low similar to
Cassidy, where the victim did not testify. See id. at 417 n.1, 705 A.2d at 69 n.1.
It is interesting to note, however, that the United States Supreme Court in
White v. Illinois concluded that the availability of the declarant is irrelevant
when the evidence falls under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, such as the
medical treatment exception. See supra Part lILA; see also MD. R. EVlD. 5803(b) (4).
192. For a discussion of &chel T., see supra notes 146-73 and accompanying text.
193. See Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 30, 536 A.2d at 680.
194. See &chel T., 77 Md. App. at 35, 549 A.2d at 34.
195. See Low, 119 Md. App. at 424-25, 705 A.2d at 73 (concluding that the victim
was very "intimidated" and likely had little grasp as to why she was sent to the
doctor).
196. See id. at 425, 705 A.2d at 73.
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consequences, the court held, as a matter of law, that the victim
subjectively believed that her physician was an examining one, on
whose observations her treatment would not rely.197 Apparently in
Maryland, there is an undefined age where appreciation of the
cause-and-effect relationship between statement and treatment becomes a warped knowledge that insincere statements may lead to recovery in litigation or conviction for child abuse. 198 Despite this inclination to deceive, these hearsay declarations would be admissible
to substantiate an expert opinion under Beahm v. ShortalL 199
Furthermore, the Low court expressed concern over the ensuing lack of contact between the doctor and her patient. 200 However,
no such concern appeared in Rachel T. In fact, the Rachel T. court
found the statements made to the child abuse expert admissible,
even though the physician only saw the child once. 201 Unlike the
Rachel T. court, the Low court indicated that the one-time visit weakened the statement's trustworthiness. 202 Therefore, to the numerous
unsettled questions concerning the use of hearsay statements in
contemplation of treatment, the Low court added the existence or
possibility of follow-up visits as a factor in determining the trustworthiness of hearsay statements. The results of this logic add more uncertainty: statements during a five-minute, one-time visit to a treating physician are admissible, but those made to a trusted, oft-visited
examining physician who does not have the good fortune of finding
an ailment that requires several visits, may not be admissible.
Although the Low court did not explicitly require treatment of
the declarant for hearsay statements to be admitted under the ex-

197. See id. (finding there was no evidence that the victim had the subjective intent
to communicate potential ailments in "hopes of further treatment").
198. See Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 30, 536 A.2d at 680 (criticizing the State's attempt
to bridge this "unbridgeable gap in the orthodox syllogism" created by these
competing considerations). The Cassidy court found that a child's lack of motive to fabricate is "quite beside the point," in that the focus is on the appreciation of the cause-and-effect relationship between statements and treatment.
[d. But see supra note 194 and accompanying text.
199. 279 Md. 321, 368 A.2d 1005 (1977); see infra notes 264-77 and accompanying
text.
200. See Low, 119 Md. App. at 424-25, 705 A.2d at 73 (noting that a child would be
intimidated by a "strange doctor in a strange setting" and a child would not
understand that further treatment would be rendered unless the doctor specifically communicated these intentions).
201. See Ro.chel T., 77 Md. App. at 36, 549 A.2d at 35.
202. See Low, 119 Md. App. at 424-25, 705 A.2d at 73.
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ception, its holding hints at the possibility that, in fact, actual treatment may be required. In the words of the Low court:
At no time did [the child abuse expert] render treatment
to Janine, and the doctor's subjective observation that she
might have rendered treatment had treatment been necessary should not control the determination of her role for
purposes of the admission of hearsay evidence. Put in general terms, the mere ability to render treatment does not
automatically give rise to the inference that one is categorically a "treating physician" as Rule 5-803 (b) (4) contemplates the term. Something more is needed than the mere
possibility that further treatment could be rendered. If that
were not the case, then any [Department of Health and
Human Services] doctor who examines a child would qualify as a treating physician within 5-803(b)(4). Or, taken to
its utmost extreme, any doctor who examines an individual
could arguably "treat" that individual if necessity called for
it. Would, then, every doctor who examines a person qualify
as a "treating physician?" Certainly not, or the rule would
be rendered utterly meaningless. 203
The difficulty in precisely defining this "something more" underscores the general difficulty and arbitrariness of determining the demarcation between treating and examining. However, under the
federal rules of evidence, this distinction is unnecessary.
C.

An Alternative Treatment-The Federal Perspective

Unlike Maryland, federal courts do not distinguish between
statements made to examining and treating physicians, opting instead to fully admit all statements pertaining to bodily condition or
medical history when made in relation to diagnosis or treatment. 204
Finding jury instructions limiting the admissibility of the statements
ineffective,205 the federal courts abandoned any restrictions on the
admissibility of hearsay statements to examining physicians. 206 The
203.
204.
205.
206.

[d. at 425-26, 705 A.2d at 73.
See supra note 105 for the text of Federal Rule 803(4).
But see infra note 275 and accompanying text.
According to the Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence
803(4):
Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay exception, as
not within its guarantee of truthfulness, statements to a physician
consulted only for the purpose of enabling him to testify. While these
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federal system is intended to admit statements made to examining
physicians,207 statements made to non-physicians consulted for medical treatment or diagnosis,20B and statements by someone other than
the patient to obtain treatment for the patient. 209
This change also has significant practical consequences. If an
expert's opinion is admissible, even though it is based on an inadmissible hearsay statement,21O the logical conclusion is that a jury
could likewise depend on the statement. 211 According to one noted
commentator: "[ u] nder prior practice [in which courts distinguished between examining and treating physicians], contrived evidence was avoided at too great a cost and in substantial departure
from the realities of medical practice. "212 This polar opposite of the
Maryland perspective on the medical treatment hearsay exception is
evidenced by two seminal cases in the United States Court of Ap-

207.

208.

209.

210.

211.
212.

statements were not admissible as substantive evidence, the expert
was allowed to state the basis of his opinion, including statements of
this kind. The distinction thus called for was one most unlikely to be
made by juries. The rule accordingly rejects the limitation. This position is consistent with the provision of [Federal] Rule [of Evidence]
703 that the facts on which expert testimony is based need not be admissible in evidence if of a kind ordinarily relied upon by experts in
·the field.
FED. R EVlD. 803(4), Advisory Committee's note; see also FED. R EVlD. 703 (providing for the admission of facts or data upon which an expert in a particular
field would ordinarily rely, even though otherwise inadmissible into evidence).
For a discussion of the general effectiveness of limiting instructions, see infra
Part IV.B.
See FED. R EVlD. 803(4) (stating that examinations as required by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 35, fall within this hearsay exception and are normally admitted).
See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 277, at 431 (noting that statements made
to non-physicians and nurses are included under the Federal Rule); MCLAIN,
supra note 52, § 803(4).2, at 370 (same).
See, e.g., MCLAIN, supra note 52, § 803(4).2, at 370 (noting that the federal
rules allow admission of statements made by persons assisting the patient in
obtaining medical assistance).
Such an expert opinion is admissible under Maryland's rules of evidence. See
supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. Notably, the statements underlying
this expert opinion are likewise admissible not for the truth of the matter asserted, but solely as the basis for the opinion. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
For an illustrative example of this reasoning, see infra notes 215-31 and accompanying text.
MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 278, at 432 (noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) eliminates distinctions between examining and treating physicians) .
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peals for the Eighth Circuit-United States v. Iron Shell!13 and United
States v. Renville. 214
In Iron Shell, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed the
defendant's conviction for assault with intent to rape, despite his
contention that the victim's statements to her physician 215 were inadmissible hearsay.216 Here, the State alleged that the defendant attempted to rape a nine year old girl.217 The victim claimed the
defendant put his arm around her, asked her to pull her pants
down, and then proceeded to pull them down himself after she refused. 218 Mter continuously screaming, the victim drew the attention
of other community members.219 Crying, the victim emerged from
the bushes, pulling up her pants. 220 During a subsequent medical
examination, the child told the doctor that a man dragged her into
the bushes, attempted to muffle her screams by covering her mouth
and neck, pulled many of her clothes off, and then stuck something
into her vagina that hurt. 221
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied a two-part inquiry: "first, is the declarant's motive consistent
with the purpose of the rule; and second, is it reasonable for the

213. 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980).
214. 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of United States v. Renvilk, see infra notes 23247 and accompanying text.
215. Notably, the court mentioned its past distinction between treating and nontreating physicians, describing the latter as "a doctor who is consulted only in
order to testify as a witness." Iron Shel~ 633 F.2d at 83 & n.8 (emphasis added). Recognizing the abandonment of this distinction by the then newly
adopted Federal Rule 803(4), the court concluded that these cases may be
persuasive authority in determining whether a patient's statements are pertinent for diagnosis or treatment. But see Low v. State, 119 Md. App. 413, 425,
705 A.2d 67, 73 (1998) (holding that an examining physician included a pediatrician/ child abuse expert).
216. See Iron Shel~ 633 F.2d at 83. The defendant contended that the doctor acted
more as an investigator than as a medical examiner by asking the victim "if
the man 'had taken her clothes off.'" Id. at 82 n.6. The defense further argued that the answer to this question did not relatively affect the nature of
the medical examination, and therefore did not result from an inquiry "'reasonably pertinent' to diagnosis or treatment." Id. at 83 (discussing FED. R
EvlD. 803(4».
217. See Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 80.
218. See id. at 81.
219. See id. at 80.
220. See id. at 81.
221. See id. at 81-82.
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physician to rely on the information in diagnosis or treatment. "222
The court first determined that the declarant's motive was consistent with the underpinnings of the rule. 223 The court, illuminating
factors such as the purpose of the examination 224 and the victim's
age,225 emphasized that nothing about the victim's demeanor indicated a motive other than a patient seeking treatment. 226 Therefore,
the court concluded that the victim's statements to her doctor satisfied the trustworthiness requirement. 227
The court further concluded that the information was pertinent to the diagnosis and treatment of the victim's possible ailments. 228 Notwithstanding the defendant's argument that the doctor's questions would not affect the scope of his examination, and
therefore were not pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, the court refused to find this fact dispositive. 229 According to the court,
"[ d] iscovering what is not injured is equally as pertinent to treatment and diagnosis as finding what is injured. "230 Again, the court
based its conclusion on the doctor's subjective reliance on the state222. Id. at 84. According to the Iron Shell court, these considerations are an outgrowth of the policy considerations underlying the rule. See id. The first prong
of the test results from the desire to ensure that the patient has the requisite
self-interest and motive to speak truthfully and openly. See id. The second
prong results from the court's belief that if the information is so accurate that
a doctor feels comfortable basing a life and death decision on it, then the
rule against hearsay should not block its admission as substantive evidence. See
id.
223. See id. ("We find no facts in the record to indicate that [the victim]'s motive
in making these statements was other than as a patient seeking treatment.").
224. See id. The doctor testified that the underlying purposes of his examination
were to treat the victim and to preserve physical evidence. See id. But see Low
v. State, 119 Md. App. 413, 433-34, 705 A.2d 67, 77 (1998) (finding the doctor's subjective belief as to the purpose of the examination irrelevant to the
determination of the trustworthiness of the victim's statement).
225. See Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84 (deferring to the trial court's determination that
the victim's age of nine years did not mitigate against a finding of trustworthiness). But see Low, 119 Md. App. at 424-25, 705 A.2d at 73 (concluding, notwithstanding the trial court's determination, that a 12 year old girl would normally be very intimidated in such a situation and would, therefore be
untrustworthy) .
226. See Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84. But see Low, 119 Md. App. at 424-25, 705 A.2d at
73.
227. See Iron Shel~ 633 F.2d at 85.
228. See id. at 84-85.
229. See id. at 84.
230. Id.
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ments in determining a course of treatment. 231
In United States v. Renville,232 a case highly criticized in Maryland,233 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the defendant's convictions on two counts of child abuse.234
In this case, the victim's half-brother testified at his own detention
hearing that the eleven year old victim admitted to him that
Renville sexually abused her.235 A few weeks following the victim's
removal, a physician examined the child, who recounted multiple
instances of sexual behavior with the defendant.236 However, at trial,
the victim recanted her story and denied telling anyone that the
defendant had abused her, aside from the Deputy Sheriff. 237 Nonetheless, a jury convicted the defendant,238 who was sentenced to two
concurrent fifteen-year terms. 239
Although the court applied the Iron Shell analysis,240 it deviated
significantly from a consideration explicitly mentioned in Iron Shell.
Although both the Iron Shell decision and the Advisory Committee
notes to the federal rules indicate otherwise,241 the Renville court
231. See id. at 84-85. The court also considered Weinstein's contention that a doctor's immediate need for relevant statements constitutes prima facie evidence
of the statement's pertinence. See id. at 85 n.11 (quoting 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803-130 (1979». The court chose not to adopt this
extreme approach, opting instead to conduct a case-by-case analysis. See Iron
Shell, 633 F.2d at 85 n.11.
232. 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985).
233. See Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 45, 536 A.2d 666, 687-88 (1988) (accusing
the Renville court of severing the medical treatment exception to the rule
against hearsay from its common-law roots).
234. See Renville, 779 F.2d at 441.
235. See id. at 432 (referring allegations of sexual abuse to the Deputy Sheriff, who
conducted a further investigation and removed the victim from her home, after this testimony by the defendant).
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 436-39. See also supra note 222 (discussing the Iron Shell two-prong
test) .
241. According to the Iron Shell court, "[i]t is important to note that the statements
concern what happened rather than who assaulted her. The former in most
cases is pertinent to diagnosis and treatment while the latter would seldom, if
ever, be sufficiently related." Iron Shel~ 633 F.2d at 84 (citing United States v.
Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added». In a subsequent footnote, the court also relied on the Advisory Committee note for the
following example: "a patient's statement that he was struck by an automobile
would qualifY but not his statement that the car was driven through a red
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held that statements of fault are pertinent to medical treatment
when the incident involves a member of the child's immediate family, and are therefore admissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 242 While the court conceded that, ordinarily, statements of
fault made during a medical examination are not pertinent to treatment,243 it concluded that the consideration changes when the alleged assailant is a member of the victim's immediate household. 244
The court declared that the emotional and psychological trauma accompanying child abuse by a member of the child's household,245
the cyclical nature of child abuse,246 and the doctor's statutory obligation to report suspected victims of child abuse supported its conclusion to affirm the defendant's conviction. 247

IV. THE NEED FOR CHANGE
If Renville and Iron Shell had been decided under Maryland law,
their outcomes would have been very different. Rather than entrusting the jury to make a credibility determination,248 Maryland courts
choose to exclude trustworthy evidence 249 simply because it involves
statements to examining physicians. 250 Given the significant loop-

242.
243.
244.
245.

246.

247.
248.

249.

250.

light." Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84 n.lO (citing FED. R EVID. 803(4) Advisory Committee's note).
See Renville, 779 F.2d at 436.
See id.
See id. at 436-37.
See id. at 437 (comparing sexual abuse to other examples provided by the Advisory Committee's notes, concluding that" [s]exual abuse of children at
home presents a wholly different situation").
See id. at 437 n.12 (relying on the physician's testimony that child abuse will
continually occur if the victim is returned to the abuser's household and that
80% of child abusers today were once abuse victims themselves).
See id. at 438.
Under Maryland law, determinations of witness (and, by logical extension, declarant) credibility are within the province of the jury. See infra Part IV.B. But
see Low v. State, 119 Md. App. 413, 424-25, 705 A.2d 67, 73 (1998) (judging the
subjective intent of the declarant).
Obviously, with every rule of exclusion, there is the probability that trustworthy evidence will be excluded in some cases. See, e.g., Milich, supra note 8, at
725. Therefore, rules of exclusion must be carefully tailored to meet their intended public policy considerations.
See Low, 119 Md. App. at 419, 705 A.2d at 70 (continuing to disallow a nontreating doctor to testify (citing Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 277 Md.
120, 124, 353 A.2d 263 (1976) (citing Rossello v. Friedel, 243 Md. 234, 241-42,
220 A.2d 537, 541 (1966»»; Wilhelm v. State Traffic Safety Comm'n, 230 Md.
91, 97, 185 A.2d 715, 717 (1962) ("[T]he principle that a non-treating physician may not relate the history given to him by a litigant."); Wolfinger v. Frey,
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holes available to a litigant looking to evade this exception, and the
existence of other assurances of trustworthiness, the treating/ examining distinction does little to serve the public policy considerations
generally underlying the rule against hearsay.251

A. Pragmatic Loopholes Undermining Maryland's Treating/Examining
Physician Distinction
1.

The Residual Hearsay Exception

Aside from the other exceptions to the rule against hearsay
that overlap the medical treatment exception,252 another significant
loophole is the residual hearsay exception. 253 -while the purpose of
this hearsay exception is not to swallow the entire rule against hearsay,254 it does provide yet another alternative to be used by those liti-

251.
252.

253.

254.

223 Md. 184, 190, 162 A.2d 745, 748 (1960) (holding an examining doctor was
"not permitted to testify with regard to, or on the basis of, the case history
given to him by [the plaintiff]"); Parker v. State, 189 Md. 244, 248-50, 55 A.2d
784, 786 (1947) (holding the court properly excluded "case history" testimony
of a non-treating physician who examined the patient on the day of the trial);
see also supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the policy reasons underlying this exception to the rule
against hearsay, see supra Part II.B.
For a discussion of other exceptions to the rule against hearsay that overlap
with the medical diagnosis or treatment hearsay exception, and a hypothetical
situation in which these exceptions would affect the admissibility of such evidence, see supra note 60.
Maryland's residual hearsay exception provides:
Under exceptional circumstances, the following are not excluded by
the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing [twentythree hearsay] exceptions [enumerated in this rule] but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which
it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
MD. R. EVID. 5-803 (b) (24). See also FED. R. EVID. 805 (providing a similar
residual exception for the federal courts); MD. R. EVID. 5-804(b) (5) (providing
a similar provision for instances in which the declarant is unavailable).
For a thorough discussion of the development and debate regarding Maryland's residual hearsay exception, see MCLAIN, supra note 52, § 2.803.4(jj), at
268-70 (discussing legislative debate over adoption of Maryland's residual
hearsay rule); Howard S. Chasanow & Jose Felipe Anderson, The Residual
Hearsay Exception: Maryland's Lukewarm Welcome, 24 U. BALT. L. REv. 1, 24-25
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gants looking to admit hearsay statements made to examining physicians; namely, the residual hearsay exception.
Maryland's residual hearsay exception is not nearly as inclusive
as Rule 5-803 (b) (4), however. Whereas statements made in contemplation of treatment are automatically admitted,255 a litigant's reliance on the residual hearsay exception requires a significant showing of trustworthiness 256 and probative value. 257 The notice
requirement under the residual hearsay exception also provides a
procedural stumbling block not included in the general medical
treatment exception to the rule against hearsay.258 Furthermore,
most courts and litigants are generally reluctant to rely on this hearsay exception, choosing to limit their emphasis on the numerous
recognized exceptions. 259

255.

256.

257.

258.

259.

(1994) (opining that the debate regarding the adoption of Maryland's
residual hearsay exception indicates that the legislature and the courts expect
that, although the rule is necessary, it will be used rarely and only in exceptional circumstances).
Since Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-803 (b) (4) requires courts to admit certain
hearsay statements, this evidence is not even subject to the state provisions excluding relevant, but unfairly prejudicial evidence. See MD. R EvID. 5-403 (excluding such evidence); MCLAiN, supra note 52, § 2.403.4, at 95 ("Rule 5-403
applies even when evidence 'may' (but not if it 'shall') be admitted under a
more specific Rule.").
Of the requirements posed by the residual hearsay exception, this is the most
difficult to meet. See LILLY, supra note 35, § 7.28, at 352 (discussing the federal
residual hearsay exception). Such difficulty also arises when a litigant attempts
to present evidence under the residual exception when the evidence is addressed by another existing exception. See id. (arguing that the residual exception should not be invoked to admit evidence that is already addressed by a
recognized exception); MCLAiN, supra note 52, § 2.803.4(jj) at 269 (discussing
the possible implications of the advisory committee note's reference to "new
and presently unanticipated situations").
Compare MD. R EVID. 5-803 (b) (4) (admitting statements in contemplation of
medical treatment "insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis
in contemplation of treatment"), with MD. R EVID. 5-803 (b) (24) (requiring,
among other things, a showing of probative value before admission). Furthermore, "[i]t is particularly appropriate for [the state courts] to exercise this
power when the fact-finder is in a good position to evaluate the reliability of
the hearsay evidence." MCLAiN, supra note 52, § 803(24).1, at 435.
Compare MD. R EVID. 5-803 (b) (4) (allowing for the automatic admission of
statements falling within the stated hearsay exception); FED. R EVID. 803(4)
(same), with Md. R. Evid. 5-803 (b) (24) (requiring notice before employing
the hearsay exception); FED. R EVID. 805 (same); MD. R EVID. 5-804(b)(5)
(providing a residual hearsay exception when the declarant is unavailable).
See MD. R EVID. 5-803(b)(24) Advisory Committee note ("It is intended that
the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in excep-
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Therefore, even though the residual hearsay exception does allow the admission of especially trustworthy evidence, it offers little
hope for litigants and defendants looking to admit hearsay statements made to examining physicians. In fact, one could question
whether a Maryland court would ever regard statements to examining physicians to be equally as trustworthy as statements admitted
under an established hearsay exception. As stated by the Cassidy
court: "[t]he heart of the exception ... is 'the underlying rationale
... that the patient's statements to his doctor are apt to be sincere
when made with an awareness that the quality and success of the
treatment may largely depend on the accuracy of the information
provided the physician.' "260
2.

Expert Testimony

Although Maryland courts distinguish between treating and examining physicians, a practitioner can undermine the distinction's
value through the effective use of expert testimony.261 By qualifYing
an examining physician as an expert in a field related to the patient's injury, practitioners can effectively present otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence. 262
Experts qualified to offer opinion testimony263 receive relatively

260.

261.

262.

263.

tional circumstances."); Chasanow & Anderson, supra note 254, at 25 (noting
that the "Maryland residual [hearsay] exceptions are more restrictive than
their federal counterparts."). However, federal courts may be more likely to
admit evidence under this hearsay exception. Compare S. Rep. No. 93-1277, at
20 (1974) (declaring that the residual hearsay exception be used "very rarely,
and only in exceptional circumstances."), with United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859, 866 (S.D.N.Y 1977) (failing to find a requirement that the hearsay exception is only applicable if extraordinary circumstances exist).
Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 28, 536 A.2d 666, 679 (1988) (correlating the
trustworthiness of a patient's statement to his need and desire for treatment
and care) (citing Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 277 Md. 120, 124, 353
A.2d 263, 265 (1976».
See Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 328-29, 368 A.2d 1005, 1009-10 (1977). Of
interest is the court's recognition that the physician could testify as to the
physician'S conclusions based on subjective symptoms for limited purposes,
such as to establish that the patient complained of those symptoms and that
the doctor based the conclusions upon that information. See id.
The circumstances under which one may be so qualified would likely allow a
family practitioner, such as the one described in the introductory hypothetical, to be qualified as an expert. See MD. R EVID. 5-702 (providing the requirements and qualifications of an expert witness).
Compare, e.g., MD. R EVID. 5-701 (restricting the use of lay opinion testimony to
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lenient treatment from the courts. 264 If carefully directed, a qualified expert265 may testify as to the substance of an otherwise inadmissible hearsay statement. 266 If the expert reasonably relies 267 on

264.

265.

266.
267.

instances in which the evidence is "rationally based on the perception of the
witness and ... helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or
the detemlination of a fact in issue"), with MD. R. EVID. 5-702 (permitting
opinion evidence offered by a qualified expert if the testimony will "assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue").
See, e.g., Laurel Beeler & William R. Wiebe, DNA Identification Tests and the
Courts, 63 WASH. L. REv. 903, 934 (1988) (discussing how admissibility of scientific evidence is more lenient under the Federal Rules of Evidence than under
state rules of evidence); Beth E. Bookwalter, Throwing the Bath Water out with
the BaITy: Wrongful Exclusion of Expert Testimony on Neonaticide Syndrome, 78 B.D.
L. REv. 1185. 1199-1200 (1998) (discussing the lenient standard the Supreme
Court established regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence); Susan R.
Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution to the Problem of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. LJ. 189, 194 (1992) (examining why "a significant number of courts take a lenient posture toward scientific evidence").
For a traditional examining physician consulted in preparation for litigation,
this requirement does not present a significant impediment. Under the Maryland Rules of Evidence:
Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. In
making that determination, the court shall determine (1) whether
the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, (2) the appropriateness of the expert testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether a sufficient factual
basis exists to support the expert testimony.
MD. R. EVID. 5-702; accord FED. R. EVID. 702.
See Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 329, 368 A.2d 1005, 1010 (1977).
See MD. R. EVID. 5-703 (providing that facts "reasonably relied upon by experts
... need not be admissible in evidence."); FED. R. EVID. 703 (same). Several
courts, including the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Beahm, recognized this
technique as a valid route to the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence. See Beahm, 279 Md. at 327, 368 A.2d at 1009 (holding that a doctor
who examines a patient in order to qualify as an expert may testify to his
medical conclusions); Maryland Dept. of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day
Nursery, 317 Md. 573, 589, 565 A.2d 1015, 1023 (1989) (holding that a medical practitioner may recount statements made by a patient for the limited purpose of explaining his expert conclusions); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Nothstein, 300 Md. 667, 679-80, 480 A.2d 807, 813-14 (1984) (noting that hearsay needed to explain the expert's basis for his opinion is admissible, but not
as substantive evidence) (citations omitted). Cf Adam T. Berkoff, Computer
Simulations in Litigation: Are Television Generation Jurors Being Misled? 77 MARQUETIE L. REv. 829, 844 (1994) (noting the ability of evidence admitted under
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 to circumvent general hearsay rules denying admissibility) .
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such hearsay evidence in forming an opinion or inference, the evidence would be admissible, subject to a proper limiting instruction. 26s The statement may thereby be presented to the jury as part
of the expert's conclusion or as part of a hypothetical question
posed by the directing attorney.269
By requiring this limiting instruction, Maryland courts impliedly
recognize a jury's ability to differentiate between substantive evidence and evidence introduced merely to support the expert's opinion. 270 Although the Maryland courts assume that juries follow limiting instructions,271 many notable jurists seriously question the
effectiveness of these instructions, and the impact upon a court's
ability to hold a fair and impartial trial.272 Notwithstanding the ques268. See MD. R EVID. 5-703(b) (permitting the introduction of evidence on which
an expert in the specified field would reasonably rely, notwithstanding its inadmissibility under other rules of evidence).
269. See MCLAIN, supra note 52, § 2.703.4(a), at 194. Obviously, the admissibility of
this evidence is not absolute; the court must determine "the underlying facts
to be 'trustworthy, necessary to illuminate testimony, and unprivileged.'" Id.
at 195. The court may also exclude evidence if it would be "unduly confusing
to the jury or unduly, unfairly prejudicial." Id.
270. See Beahm, 279 Md. at 327-28 n.5, 368 A.2d at 1009 n.5 (1977). Of note, however, is Maryland's refusal to generally admit hearsay statements in contemplation of treatment, without permitting an opposing party to question its trustworthiness, and then allowing the jury to make a credibility determination.
For a discussion of how this would be a preferable treatment, see infra Part
IV.B.
271. See McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 615, 375 A.2d 551, 557-58 (1977) (recognizing that a court must presume that a jury will follow its instructions); Weiner v. State, 55 Md. App. 548, 559, 464 A.2d 1096, 1103 (1983) (recognizing
the legal practice of admitting evidence for a limited purpose and presuming
that the jury will follow its instructions). Nonetheless, the McKnight and Weiner
courts conceded to the limited utility of these instructions, concluding that
limiting instructions could not cure the unfair prejudice created by the admission of some evidence. See McKnight, 280 Md. at 615, 375 A.2d at 557 (holding
that the prejudice created by the unfair admission of other crimes' evidence
could not be cured by a limiting instruction); Weiner, 55 Md. App. at 559, 464
A.2d at 1103 (holding that the unfair admission of other crimes' evidence
could not be cured by a limiting instruction).
272. See McKnight, 280 Md. at 615, 375 A.2d at 557 (quoting Delli Paoli v. United
States, 352 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting» ("The fact of the
matter is that too often such admonition against misuse is intrinsically ineffective. "); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by
instructions to the jury ... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."); Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (Learned
Hand, J.) (" [T]he recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is
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tionable effectiveness of these instructions,273 however, the failure of
a court to render these instructions has dire consequences under
Maryland law. 274 This tenuous difference under the common law led
to the federal courts' abandonment of the distinction between treating and examining physicians. 275
Due to the significant restrictions placed on the residual hearsay exception 276 and the strict requirements of other alternative
hearsay exceptions, the presentation of hearsay statements like
those in Cassidy, Rachel T., Low, and the introductory hypothetical
may only be entered into evidence in Maryland through expert testimony. Although compelling, such evidence cannot alone sustain a
conviction or a finding of liability because such evidence cannot be
considered as substantive evidence. 277 While the jury's ability to
make so subtle a distinction could be questioned, the fact-finder, as
the final arbiter of credibility, may be in a more appropriate position to evaluate this evidence.

B.

The Fact-jinder as an Alternative Protection

Determinations of fact are within the province of the factfinder, be it the jury or the presiding judge. 278 Included within this

273.

274.

275.
276.
277.

278.

beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else."); People v. Aranda, 63
Cal.2d. 518, 407 P.2d 265, 272 (1965) (Traynor, CJ.) ("A jury cannot 'segregate evidence into separate intellectual boxes.'"). Interestingly, this debate
threatens the rule against hearsay itself because a jury sufficiently sophisticated to make such a distinction would also be sufficiently sophisticated to
distinguish between the credibility of hearsay statements and live testimony.
See McKnight, 280 Md. at 615, 375 A.2d at 579. A jury's difficulty in distinguishing between substantive evidence and evidence solely underlying an expert
opinion is increased by the courts' challenge in differentiating between a
treating and examining physician. For a discussion of this blurry distinction
under Maryland case law, see supra Part III.B.
See Low v. State, 119 Md. App. 413, 425, 705 A.2d 67, 73-74 (1998) (reversing a
criminal conviction for second degree rape, second degree sexual offense,
and child abuse due to the trial court's unlimited admission of hearsay statements relayed through the testimony of an examining physician); Cassidy v.
State, 74 Md. App. I, 49-50, 536 A.2d 666, 690 (1988) (reversing a child abuse
and assault conviction on similar grounds).
See supra note 206 for a discussion of the relevant portion of the Advisory
Committee's note to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4).
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 327, 368 A.2d 1005, 1010 (1977) (noting
the limited admissibility of such evidence). However, the expert opinion
grounded on such hearsay statements is substantive evidence and does support a jury finding. See supra notes 263-69 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Blumenthal Kahn Elec. Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
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fact-finding power is the responsibility of making credibility determinations. 279 The fact-finder is intended to be the appropriate vehicle
for determining how trustworthy evidence really is.280
Yet, even though a Maryland jury can determine the credibility
of an expert where observations are reasonably based on inadmissible hearsay,281 Maryland courts have been reluctant to charge the
jury with the responsibility of determining the credibility of the
hearsay statements themselves. 282 A commentator advocating the
abandonment of the rules of evidence touches upon the ultimate
irony of the state's stance:
Under today's rules, modern juries are asked to evaluate
conflicting expert testimony on everything from DNA
matching to post-traumatic stress syndrome. The idea that
the same juries cannot handle the relatively obvious
strengths and weaknesses of hearsay evidence is an odd
one. . . . To claim that such problems exist means one can
think of a hearsay statement that jurors would mishandle
for a reason they could not appreciate, even if it were explained to them. This reflects an eighteenth-century class
arrogance sorely out of place in today's society.283

279.

280.

281.

282.

120 Md. App. 630, 638, 708 A.2d 1, 4-5 (1997) (describing the jury function).
Only if there is no rational basis for the fact-finder's conclusion will an appellate court disturb this determination. See, e.g., Fraidin v. State, 85 Md. App.
231, 242, 583. A.2d 1065, 1071 (1991) ("The conviction must be affirmed if,
'after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.''') (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979» .
See, e.g., Binnie v. State, 321 Md. 572, 580-81, 583 A.2d 1037, 1041 (1991) (recognizing that the determination as to a witness' reliability and credibility is a
jury decision); Perry v. State, 234 Md. 48, 51, 197 A.2d 833, 835, 835 (1964)
("It is axiomatic that the weights to be given to the evidence and believability
vel non of witnesses are matters for the jury to determine.") (citing Duffin v.
State, 229 Md. 434, 184 A.2d 624 (1962); Wright v. State, 222 Md. 242, 159
A.2d 636 (1960); Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 146 A.2d 29 (1958»; Douglas v.
State, 32 Md. App. 311, 316-17, 360 A.2d 474, 477 (1976) (noting assessments
and observations of a witness' conduct and demeanor are proper and imperative to the fact finding process).
See, e.g., Muir v. State, 64 Md. App. 648, 654, 498 A.2d 666, 668 (1985), aff'd
308 Md. 208, 517 A.2d 1105 (1986) (noting that the fact-finder may freely accept evidence it believes and reject that which it does not).
See, e.g., Beahm, 279 Md. at 327, 368 A.2d at 1010 (citing Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 277 Md. 120, 124, 353 A.2d 263, 266 (1976».
See id.

o
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While this commentator and the Advisory Committee wntmg
on Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) would disagree as to the jury's
ability to comprehend a limiting instruction,284 neither would likely
challenge the fact-finder's responsibility to make credibility determinations.285 Therefore, if properly guided, a jury could balance the
importance and weaknesses of an examining physician's testimony
to determine liability or guilt. 286 A properly conducted and effective
cross-examination, in Wigmore's words, "the greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth,"287 would undoubtedly expose weaknesses in an examining physician's testimony.288 By allowing litigants to inquire into the number of times a physician interacted with a patient, whether the physician discussed the causeand-effect relationship between the patient's statements and subsequent treatment, and any measures undertaken by the physician to
relate her ability to perform treatment to the patient would expose
the frailties that so concerned the Cassidy and Low courts. 289

v.

CONCLUSION

The rule against hearsay provides an effective roadblock to
those looking to fabricate evidence, escape the penalty of peIjury,
or deprive their opponent of the right of cross-examination. 290 How283. Milich, supra note 8, at 771-72. This Comment does not intend to argue that
the courts' difficulty in handling the hearsay exception for statements in contemplation of treatment demonstrates the weaknesses of the entire rule
against hearsay.
284. See supra note 206 for the exact language of the relevant portion of the Advisory Committee note.
285. This argument nears absurdity when one considers a judge as a fact-finder. See
Milich, supra note 8, at 772.
If, despite all the learned judge knows about the potential frailties of
hearsay in general, she concludes that it is rational and fair to accord
some weight to specific hearsay, what justification could exist for forbidding this? Is there something wrong with this evidence that the
trial judge cannot understand and factor into her evaluation?
Id.
286. See MCLAIN, supra note 52, § 2.803.4(0), at 255 (comparing FED. R EVID. 803
and MD. R EVID. 5-803 (b) (4». "One might add that the fact-finder is likely to
see that self-serving statements to a non-treating, but testifying, expert are suspect." Id.
287. See WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 1367, at 32.

288. See id.
289. For the analysis undertaken by these courts, see supra notes 135-67 and 175208.
290. See supra notes 3345 and accompanying text.
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ever, to serve public policy initiatives, the law affords numerous exceptions to the rule against hearsay.291 An example of such an exception permits trial courts to admit hearsay statements made in
contemplation of medical treatment. 292 Although this exception
plays an important role in Supreme Court,293 Maryland,294 and federal court case law,295 the methods used by individual jurisdictions
reveal a lack of unity. One point of differentiation is whether a
court should fully admit the testimony of examining physicians-traditionally defined as those consulted primarily for litigation. 296 While Maryland courts relatively adhere to the common
law's refusal to fully admit hearsay statements to these individuals,
recent case law has significantly muddled the definition of examining physician. 297 Rather than attempting to untangle this confusion,
Maryland should follow the lead of the federal courts by abandoning this arbitrary distinction. 29B In doing so, Maryland courts
would recognize the realities of the .courtroom299 and finally relinquish this credibility determination to its rightful owner-the factfinder.3°O

David S. Gray
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